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INTRODUCTION
The World Bank plays an indispensable role as a global leader in
combating poverty world-wide. Comprising the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“IBRD”) and the International Development Association (“IDA”), the World Bank provides funds to developing
countries with the aim of eradicating poverty and hunger.1 Since 1990, it
has disbursed more than $690 billion. In fiscal year 2015 alone, it committed $60 billion in loans, grants, and guarantees across more than 300 projects.2 This amount exceeds the gross domestic products of roughly half
the world’s countries. Projects funded by the Bank can be an attractive
source of potential business for the private sector, with nearly half of recent
funds going to infrastructure projects in the energy, transportation, water,
and IT sectors—areas ripe for private sector participation.3
The countries receiving the most World Bank funds—the world’s underdeveloped and developing countries—also tend to be those perceived as
posing higher corruption risks.4 The Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index (“TI CPI”) is a commonly used proxy for corruption

1. See The World Bank, A Guide to the World Bank xix (3d ed. 2011) (explaining the
role of the World Bank). The term “World Bank” refers to the IBRD and IDA, while the
“World Bank Group” refers collectively to the IBRD and IDA, together with the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(“MIGA”), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”).
Id. at 2, 10. Unless specifically noted otherwise, references in this article to the Bank or the
World Bank refer to the IBRD and IDA.
2. See The World Bank, Annual Report 2015, 4-5, 30, 34, 38, 42, 46, and 50 (2015),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/annual-report [https://perma.cc/AQM5-ZH3T] (detailing World Bank funding in 2015). The World Bank Annual Report 2014 covers the period
from July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015.
3. See The World Bank, Annual Report 2014, 15 (2014) (reporting that helping countries to meet basic infrastructure needs accounted for 47 percent of World Bank’s total assistance of client countries in fiscal 2014).
4. See generally Eric Chetwynd et al., Corruption and Poverty: A Review of Recent
Literature, (Management Systems International, D.C.), Jan. 2003; S. Gupta et al., Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty? 29 (IMF Working Paper, May 1998) (“The
impact of corruption on income inequality and poverty is considerable.”); Paolo Mauro,
Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Agenda for Further Research, 35 FINANCE &
DEVELOPMENT, at 13 (Mar. 1998) (“One striking empirical finding is that poorer countries
are usually considered to be more corrupt.”); The Integrity Vice Presidency, FY 13 Annual
Update (The World Bank, D.C.), 2013, at 3 (“Those who have the greatest need are also the
most vulnerable. It is precisely because institutions may be weak, systems lacking, and resources scarce that countries turn to the World Bank for financial and technical assistance.”).
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risk.5 In 2015, the TI CPI scored 167 countries and territories on a scale
from 0 to 100. Countries that score less than 50 out of 100 “are perceived
to have a serious corruption problem.”6 The top ten recipients of IDA financing for fiscal year 2015—Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Kenya,
Myanmar, Pakistan, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Vietnam—averaged a score of
just 30.7 on the 2015 TI CPI.7 The top ten all-time recipients of IBRD
funds—Argentina, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Morocco,
Poland, Turkey, and Ukraine—fare only slightly better with an average TI
CPI score of 38.3.8 In the last decade, these countries were cited more than
280 times in U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) enforcement actions.9
Companies pursuing Bank-funded projects can face heightened risks
of corruption and other contracting improprieties. The size, scope, and
complexity of many of these projects, combined with the potential for substantial government involvement in geographies with challenging regulatory regimes and local business customs, amplify the risks.10 Of course, the
5. Transparency International is a global organization that seeks “to stop corruption
and promote transparency, accountability and integrity at all levels and across all sectors of
society.”
Mission, Vision and Values, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
https://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/mission_vision_and_values/0/
[https://perma.cc/7E6X-5DLQ]. Its Corruption Perceptions Index “ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be[,] . . . drawing on corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions.” Corruption Perceptions
Index
2014:
In
Detail,
TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/in_detail [https://perma.cc/5UU4-4U49].
6. See Visualizing the Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/infographic [https://perma.cc/89PU5REA] (charting global corruption perceptions in 2013).
7. See The World Bank, IDA Financing, http://www.worldbank.org/
ida/financing.html [https://perma.cc/8Y9Q-E3PZ] (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) (detailing recipients of IDA Financing); Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index
2014, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table [https://perma.cc/QNN8-GTX7]
(last visited Mar. 24, 2016) (charting the corruption score of each country and territory).
These same ten countries have an average rank of 137.5 (out of 189) for “ease of doing
business” in the World Bank’s June 2015 Doing Business Report—an annual survey of the
ease of doing business around the world. The World Bank Group, Doing Business – Economy Rankings, http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings [https://perma.cc/LUD3-NRWL]
(last visited Mar. 24, 2016).
8. See Annual Report 2015, supra note 2, at 57 (charting recipients of IDA funds);
Transparency
International,
Corruption
Perceptions
Index
2015,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table [https://perma.cc/2S3R-QLJ4] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) (charting perceived corruption of various countries).
9. Gibson Dunn analysis (on file with author). The FCPA prohibits bribery of nonU.S. public officials and sets standards of recordkeeping and internal controls at corporations that are publicly traded in the United States, and is dually enforced by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
10. See generally Dana Maria Pop, Tackling Corruption in Development Projects:
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World Bank is attuned to these risks and their consequences; it estimates
that more than $1 trillion is paid in bribes globally each year.11 The World
Economic Forum has estimated that the cost of corruption annually exceeds
5% of the global gross domestic product, adding up to a 10% surcharge to
the cost of doing business globally and up to 25% to the cost of procurement contracts in developing countries.12 These figures help to quantify
how corruption can sap the World Bank’s resources and deeply undermine
its mission. As World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim articulated,
“[E]ach dollar lost to corruption is a dollar stolen from a pregnant woman
who needs health care; or from a girl or a boy who deserves an education;
or from communities that need roads and clean water.”13
Dovetailing with this broader concern, the IBRD’s Articles of Agreement themselves require it to “make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any [funding] are used only for the purposes for which the [funding] was granted,” creating a fiduciary duty that underpins its efforts to
police misconduct in Bank-funded projects.14 To combat the fraud and corWorld
Bank
Sanctions
and
Corporate
Risks,
SUSTAINALYTICS,
http://www.sustainalytics.com/tackling-corruption-development-projects-world-banksanctions-and-corporate-risks [https://perma.cc/3K28-ZABN] (analyzing impact of corruption on business); see also John Lurie & Nicholas Burkill, Bribery and Corruption in the
Construction Industry: Challenges for International Construction and Engineering Projects,
29 CONSTRUCTION L.J. 17 (Feb. 2013) (looking at bribery and corruption in the construction
industry).
11. See Six Questions on the Cost of Corruption with World Bank Institute Global
Governance Director Daniel Kaufmann, THE WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20190295~menuPK:34457~pagePK:34370~
piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html [https://perma.cc/YX99-S8XG] (last visited Mar. 24,
2016) (estimating annual worldwide bribery of about $1 trillion); see also The World Bank’s
Anti-Corruption Guidelines and Sanctions Reform: A User’s Guide, (The World Bank,
D.C.) Oct. 15, 2006 (“Diversion of funds from development projects through fraud, corruption, collusion, and coercion or obstruction . . . impairs the ability of governments, donors
and the World Bank to achieve the goals of reducing poverty, attracting investment, and encouraging good governance.”); Sanjay Pradhan, How Open Data is Changing International
Aid, TED TALKS, https://www.ted.com/talks/sanjay_pradhan_how_open_data_is_changing_
international_aid/transcript?language=en [https://perma.cc/MZ5S-6SVT] (June 2012)
(“[T]he challenge of development: abject poverty surrounded by corruption.”); Corruption
‘Impoverishes and Kills Millions,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-29040793 [https://perma.cc/NLF2-XBX5] (reporting that millions of lives are
lost because of $1 trillion a year taken out of poor countries due to corruption).
12. International Chamber of Commerce et al., The Business Case against Corruption
at 2, (providing the estimates of the cost of corruption).
13. Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, (The World Bank Office of Suspension and Debarment, D.C.) 2015, 3.
14. IBRD Articles of Agreement, art. III, § 5(b); accord IDA Articles of Agreement,
art. V, § 1(g); see also Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, supra
note 13, at 7 (explaining the World Bank’s fiduciary duty deriving from its Articles of
Agreement); World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. I § 1.01(a) (Apr. 15, 2012) (requiring
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ruption that undermine its goal of fighting poverty, the World Bank has
implemented—and continually developed—robust integrity enforcement
mechanisms to discipline firms and individuals found to have engaged in
misconduct in connection with Bank-funded projects.
The implementation of enforcement mechanisms is a relatively recent
development in the Bank’s seventy-plus year history. In 1999, the Bank
created the Anti-Corruption and Fraud Investigation Unit—the precursor to
what is now The Integrity Vice Presidency (“INT”), the Bank’s investigatory and prosecutorial division—and brought its first sanction cases against
seven companies and two individuals.15 Also in 1999, the Bank defined
two types of misconduct that can lead to sanctions (called “Sanctionable
Practices”)—fraudulent and corrupt practices. This was followed by the
addition of collusive and coercive practices in 2004 and an “obstructive
practice” in 2006. World Bank Guidelines provide unique descriptions of
each of the five Sanctionable Practices and specify the elements of each offense.16
In recent years, World Bank enforcement of Sanctionable Practices
has been vigorous. Over the five years from 2011 to 2015, the World Bank
publicly sanctioned more than 300 entities and numerous subsidiaries,
reaching a high water mark of 84 in fiscal year 2012.17 During roughly the
same time period, by comparison, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)—the dual enforcers of the FCPA—initiated 144 FCPA enforcement actions.18 The World
Bank also has a significant pipeline of cases, with 99 new investigations
initiated in fiscal year 2015.19
The Bank’s sanctions regime is not supposed to be punitive.20 Neverthe World Bank to ensure the funds it provides are used only for their intended purposes).
15. The Integrity Vice Presidency FY 14 Annual Update, (The World Bank, D.C.) at 1.
16. The World Bank’s Anti-Corruption Guidelines and Sanctions Reform: A User’s
Guide, supra note 11, at 5-9.
17. FY 14 Annual Update, at 34; FY 15 Annual Update, at 38.
18. 2015 Year-Year FCPA Update (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP) Jan. 4, 2016, at 2,
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2015-Year-End-FCPA-Update.aspx
[https://perma.cc/8JWV-FNFS].
19. FY 15 Annual Update, supra note 17, at 1.
20. See Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012 at 4
n.23 (“The principal goal of World Bank Group sanctions proceedings is to protect the
Group’s funds, not to ‘punish’ respondents . . . .”). In contrast to SEC and DOJ enforcement
actions, World Bank sanctions typically do not involve monetary penalties. See Frank Fariello & Giovanni Bo, The World Bank Group Sanctions System and Access to Justice for
Small and Medium-Size Enterprises, 5 THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW 417, 436 (H. Cissé
et al. ed. 2014) (noting the Bank’s sanctions system is meant to be protective and rehabilitative, involving re-education and commitment on the part of the respondent); World Bank
Sanctions Procedures, art. IX § 9.01 (Apr. 15, 2012) (describing the nature of the sanctions
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theless, the consequences for violating the World Bank’s guidelines have
teeth. Of the types of sanctions available, the most severe is debarment,
which precludes entities for a period of time from participating, directly or
indirectly, in future Bank-financed activities.21 If a company’s business
depends on projects funded even in part by multilateral development banks
(“MDBs”), debarment can pose a greater threat—indeed, often an existential one—than the court or administrative sanctions associated with an
FCPA enforcement action.22
Sanctions are public23 and often accompanied by severe conditions
and collateral consequences, including the imposition of a corporate compliance monitor and third-party investigator,24 ongoing cooperation requirements,25 reciprocal blacklisting by other MDBs and members of the
World Bank Group,26 and referrals to government authorities.27 On a more
such as being declared ineligible for a Bank-financed contract or loan).
21. Id.
22. See F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Elizabeth Goergen Silver, The U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Enforcement and Compliance, 285 SECURITIES PRACTICE
PORTFOLIO SERIES (BNA) A-36 (2014) (comparing the threat of debarment with FCPA action).
23. See Todd J. Canni, Debarment is No Longer Private World Bank Business: An Examination of the Bank’s Distinct Debarment Procedures Used for Corporate Procurements
and Financed Projects, 40 PUBLIC CONTRACT L.J. 147,147–48 (2010) (discussing circumstances that led the Bank to publicize all debarments).
24. See, e.g., Press Release, The World Bank, The World Bank Group Debars Macmillan Limited for Corruption in World Bank-supported Education Project in Southern Sudan
(April 30, 2010) http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2010/04/30/the-worldbank-group-debars-macmillan-limited-for-corruption-in-world-bank-supported-educationproject-in-southern-sudan [https://perma.cc/2B7V-UUH9] (describing the actions the sanctioned party agreed to take as a condition of reduced debarment). For a detailed discussion
of FCPA monitorships, see generally F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Veronica S.
Root, Somebody’s Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and How They Can Work Better, 13
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 321 (2011).
25. See, e.g., Press Release The World Bank, World Bank Debars SWECO Environment AB, and Conditionally Non-debars SWECO International AB for Three Years (Mar.
28, 2014) http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/28/world-bank-debarssweco-environment-three-years [https://perma.cc/5594-CMSE] (noting that the sanctions
include the sanctioned party’s cooperation with INT’s investigation).
26. Sanctions issued by the Bank may be enforced by other international financial institutions pursuant to the April 9, 2010 Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment
Decisions. In addition, each member of the World Bank Group has its own sanctions procedures, which can differ slightly. For example, a World Bank debarment does not necessarily lead to a reciprocal debarment by the IFC, because the IFC’s sanctions procedures
govern how a World Bank debarment impacts the ability to participate in IFC projects. See
IFC Sanctions Procedures, art. IX § 9.01(c) (discussing the impact of a World Bankimposed debarment on an entity’s relationship with the IFC).
27. The Bank referred 22, 22, and 23 cases to national authorities in fiscal years 2015,
2014, and 2013, respectively, turning over evidence discovered during World Bank investigations. See FY 15 Annual Update, supra note 17, at 52-54 (listing the referrals made in
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practical level, debarment can complicate even private international business transactions. For instance, sophisticated business partners routinely
conduct due diligence that utilizes public debarment lists.28 This can lead
to questions from prospective business partners that are difficult for a debarred entity to answer in light of confidentiality that the Bank requires
around its sanctions—with the result being, at times, lost business opportunities.29 Sanctions also complicate corporate transactions, because of the
uncertainty under existing Bank policies, procedures, and practice about the
circumstances in which sanctions could extend to a purchaser or successor
of a sanctioned entity.30 A debarment can complicate day-to-day operafiscal year 2015); FY 14 Annual Update, supra note 17, at 47-50 (listing the referrals made
in fiscal year 2014). In addition to creating the possibility of criminal proceedings in certain
instances, in at least one case, the Bank sanctions regime effectively supplanted the criminal
justice system: a government recently forewent criminal sanctions against a corporation altogether because “the act had [already] resulted in extensive reactions from the World
Bank” and a corporate penalty combined with the sanctions “might have disproportionate
consequences for the company.” HR-2013-1394-A, No. 2012/2114, Norconsult (Supreme
Court of Norway), http://www.domstol.no/en/Enkelt-domstol/-Norges-Hoyesterett/ Summary-of-Recent-Supreme-Court-Decisions/Summary-of-Supreme-Court-Decisions-2013
[https://perma.cc/A8WP-3FAW].
But the Bank has temporarily limited its referrals, pending the outcome of litigation in Canada. In 2011, INT provided information to Canadian authorities resulting from its investigation of SNC-Lavalin Group, Inc., which led to the criminal prosecution of several former
employees in Canada. FY 15 Annual Update, supra note 17, at 15 n.1. Lawyers for the
charged employees subsequently requested the Bank’s records, but the Bank refused, insisting on immunity based on its status as an international organization. See World Bank Group
v. Wallace, 2014 ONSC 7449 (36315), at ¶¶ 33-34, 40, 64-65. The Ontario Superior Court
of Justice rejected the argument and ordered the World Bank Group to produce the documents, finding that the Bank had impliedly waived its immunities by volunteering the information to and cooperating with the authorities. See FY 15 Annual Update, at 15 n.1. The
Supreme Court of Canada granted the Bank’s leave to appeal, and a decision is pending. Id.
During the pendency of this litigation, the Bank has limited its referrals to national authorities.
28. Cf. Todd J. Canni, Debarment is No Longer Private World Bank Business: An Examination of the Bank’s Distinct Debarment Procedures Used for Corporate Procurements
and Financed Projects, 40 PUBLIC CONTRACT L.J. 147, 149 (2010) (“[T]he Bank’s debarments have the potential to inflict far-reaching reputational and economic harm on contractors, ‘roughly the equivalent to Hawthorne’s scarlet letter.’”).
29. See World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. XIII, § 13.06 (Apr. 15, 2012) (“Neither
the Respondent (include any Affiliate thereof) nor the Bank shall disclose to, or discuss
with, any third party any part of the record, or information relating thereto, except” for purposes of obtaining legal counsel, compliance with a court order, or where the Bank deems
disclosure necessary in accordance with policies and procedure).
30. See World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IX, § 9.04(c) (Apr. 15, 2012) (discussing the application of sanctions to successors and assigns); The World Bank Group’s Sanctions Regime: Information Note (The World Bank, D.C.), at 9, 20–21 (noting that the Sanctions Procedures allows affiliates of a respondent to be sanctioned); see also The World
Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, ¶¶ 74–75 (2015) (considering
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tions as well. As one example, the circumstances in which the Bank would
permit a debarred entity to participate in privately funded portions of a project that may receive some Bank financing in the future are unpredictable.31
And though the consequences can be severe, the standard of proof to
establish a Sanctionable Practice is relatively modest. Citing the “administrative” character of its investigations, INT need only prove “that it is more
likely than not that the alleged misconduct has occurred.”32 INT’s burden
is “lower than the criminal standard of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’” and is
instead “akin to a ‘balance of probabilities.’”33 No doubt this has contributed to a high rate of success in substantiating Sanctionable Practices. In
2014 and 2015, for example, the World Bank’s adjudicative body that decides contested cases, known as the “Sanctions Board,” issued twenty decisions that considered thirty nine separate allegations of Sanctionable Practices. Thirty of the Sanctionable Practices alleged by INT (nearly 77%)
were substantiated. Twenty seven of the thirty six named entities or individuals (75%) were sanctioned in those decisions.
What may be particularly surprising is the variety of conduct that can
give rise to a Sanctionable Practice and how it can differ from analogous
U.S. laws. The recent explosion in FCPA enforcement and stepped-up international anti-corruption enforcement, in general, have helped to sensitize
many multinational companies to the risks of corrupt business practices.34
Although some World Bank sanctions cases involve traditional bribery
schemes,35 the World Bank casts a much wider enforcement net. Statistically speaking, the Bank is approximately six times more likely to scrutinize an entity for fraud rather than corruption.36
successor liability); The World Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 66, ¶¶ 28–
30 (2014) (same).
31. See World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IX, § 9.01(c) (Apr. 15, 2012) (declaring
debarred entity ineligible for a Bank-financed contract or loan).
32. The World Bank, External Investigations, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTDOII/0,,contentMDK:2
2641983~menuPK:2452528~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:588921,00.htm
l [https://perma.cc/5FHJ-FEYR].
33. Id.
34. See generally F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Elizabeth Goergen Silver,
The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Enforcement and Compliance, 285 SECURITIES
PRACTICE PORTFOLIO SERIES (BNA) A-25, A-73–A-85 (2014) (discussing the recent increase
in FCPA enforcement and multinational efforts to fight corruption).
35. See, e.g., Press Release, The World Bank, World Bank Sanctions Oxford University Press for Corrupt Practices Impacting Education Projects in East Africa (July 3, 2012)
(noting “improper payments to government officials for two contracts to supply text books
in relation to two World Bank-financed projects”).
36. Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, supra note 13, at 28
(graphing the percentage of cases and settlements the Bank enforced by type of sanctionable
practice, showing fraud as 86% and corruption as 14%).
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Given the Bank’s intense enforcement, the variety of conduct that can
give rise to a violation, the relaxed burden for proving a violation, and the
significant consequences of sanctions that can result, international business
organizations, as well as legal and compliance professionals who work with
multinational companies, should understand this new and evolving area and
its potentially profound ramifications for individual companies. This article seeks to elucidate the World Bank’s integrity enforcement regime and
endeavors to contribute to a fuller understanding of the legal concepts articulated in the Sanctions Procedures. In particular, the following analysis
of these areas attempts to help furnish a richer and more dynamic conceptualization of the developing sanctions definitions, and also endeavors to
draw analogies to more established legal concepts and enforcement regimes—specifically, available analogues under U.S. law. The World
Bank’s Legal Vice Presidency itself has noted the need to look to generally
accepted principles of law to develop the understanding of each Sanctionable Practice,37 and the Sanctions Board has considered general principles of
law in deciding cases.38 The treatment below aims to play a role in understanding these legal concepts, which are so crucial to this active and growing enforcement regime.
I.

THE WORLD BANK SANCTIONS PROCESS

Entities that participate in World Bank-funded projects are subject to
Bank rules by becoming parties to agreements that incorporate the Bank’s
Anti-Corruption Guidelines, Procurement Guidelines, or Consultant Guidelines—documents that define Sanctionable Practices and set forth the obli37. See Anne-Marie Leroy, Advisory Opinion on Certain Issues Arising in Connection
with Recent Sanctions Cases, Opinion No. 2010/1, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY UNIT OF THE
WORLD BANK, at 5-6 (Nov. 15, 2010). (viewing general principles of law as a useful and
legitimate source of law for the sanctions regime).
38. See, e.g., The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 57, ¶ 8
(“In the absence of guidance on how to define . . . exceptional circumstances under the Statute and Procedures, the Bank’s legislative history, or the Sanctions Board’s previous jurisprudence, the Sanctions Board looked to general principles of law, as demonstrated by leading international and national practice, to inform its analysis as set out in Sanctions Board
Decision No. 43.”); The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 80, ¶
12 & n.6 (considering the governing rules and procedures at other international administrative tribunals). In other cases, however, the Sanctions Board has observed that the Sanctions Board Statute and Sanctions Procedures “do not provide any basis on which to consider a national law framework as controlling in the Bank’s sanctions proceedings, and . . . the
scope of a respondent’s liability under the Bank’s administrative sanctions process may not
be coextensive with the scope of its potential liability under national law.” Sanctions Board
Decision No. 65, ¶ 42 (2014) (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 45, ¶ 46 (2011) and
Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 51 (2012)).
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gations of borrowers and recipients of loan proceeds.39 The Procurement
Guidelines and Consultant Guidelines apply to procurement actions under
Bank loans and credits, and are incorporated into standard Bank bidding
documents and contracts.40 In 2006, the Bank implemented a series of reforms to its sanctions process, including adopting the Anti-Corruption
Guidelines, which expanded the sanctions regime to cover recipients of
Bank funds other than consultants, suppliers, and contractors from whom
goods and services are procured.41 Borrowers of Bank funds are required
to include provisions in contracts with each recipient of loan proceeds that
incorporate the Anti-Corruption Guidelines.42 Further, although the sanctions regime is rooted in contract, the Sanctions Board has asserted jurisdiction over—and can debar—individual employees of an entity that was
itself subject to the Guidelines by competing for or receiving a contract,
even if the applicable Guidelines do not specifically refer to the possibility
39. See Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants (“World Bank Anti-Corruption Guidelines”) ¶ 5 (Oct. 15, 2006 rev. Jan. 2011) (“These Guidelines apply to the Borrower and all
other persons or entities which either receive Loan proceeds for their own use (e.g., ‘end
users’), persons or entities such as fiscal agents which are responsible for the deposit or
transfer of Loan proceeds . . . , and persons or entities which take or influence decisions regarding the use of Loan proceeds.”); Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and NonConsulting Services under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers (“World Bank Procurement Guidelines”) ¶ 1.16(e) (Jan. 2011 rev. July 2014) (requiring
“that a clause be included in bidding documents and in contracts financed by a Bank loan,
requiring bidders, suppliers and contractors, and their sub-contractors, agents, personnel,
consultants, service providers, or suppliers, to permit the Bank to inspect all accounts, records, and other documents relating to the submission of bids and contract performance, and
to have them audited by auditors appointed by the Bank”); Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers (“World Bank Consultant Guidelines”) § 1.8 (Jan. 2011, rev. July 2014) (“The principles, rules, and procedures outlined in these Guidelines apply to all contracts for
consulting services financed in whole or in part from Bank loans.”); see also The World
Bank Group’s Sanctions Regime: Information Note, at 18 (“It is clear from this expansive
formulation that the jurisdiction of the Bank’s sanctions regime essentially includes any and
all actors involved in Bank financed procurement, other than the Borrower itself.”). The
World Bank has, with some exceptions, consistently defined the Sanctionable Practices
across the different versions of the Anti-Corruption Guidelines, Procurement Guidelines,
and Consultant Guidelines. For ease of reference, this article refers to the Procurement
Guidelines unless otherwise stated.
40. See Mario A. Aguilar, Jit B.S. Gill & Livio Pino, Preventing Fraud and Corruption
in World Bank Projects: A Guide for Staff (The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development/The World Bank, D.C.) 8-10 (2000) (discussing the Procurement Guidelines
and Consultant Guidelines that embed the Bank’s Anticorruption policy on procurement);
World Bank Anti-Corruption Guidelines 3 (May 5, 2008) (describing the roles of Procurement Guidelines and Consultant Guidelines).
41. Id. at 11.
42. World Bank Anti-Corruption Guidelines § 9(d).
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of sanctioning individuals.43
Against a ten-year statute of limitations, sanctions can result “if at any
time the Bank determines that [the] individual or entity has engaged in
[Sanctionable Practices] in connection with [Bank-funded projects]”44—
typically during bidding, procurement, and execution of a Bank-funded
project. Again, the Sanctionable Practices have World Bank-specific definitions and application; one should not necessarily associate them with
analogous national laws. The Legal Vice Presidency of the World Bank
Group has noted, however, that it is sometimes appropriate for the Sanctions Board to resort to “general principles of law” in resolving issues, given that the legal framework for the sanctions regime is “thin.”45
The World Bank’s process to sanction companies and individuals alleged to have acted improperly in connection with Bank-funded projects is
described in and governed by several documents, among them the World
Bank Sanctions Procedures (which describe the procedures to be followed
in cases involving alleged Sanctionable Practices), the Sanctions Board
Statute (which describes the operation and composition of the Bank’s adjudicative body that determines whether misconduct occurred and the appropriate sanction in contested cases), and the World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines (which provide guidance on the considerations that the Bank believes
are relevant to sanctioning decisions). The administrative nature of this
system means that many of the due process safeguards available in sanc43. See, e.g., The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 81, ¶ 29
(2015) (recognizing that the Sanctions Board may assert jurisdiction over corporate officers,
managers, and directors employed by a firm); The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions
Board Decision No. 64, ¶ 28 (2014) (noting that the Bank can assert jurisdiction to sanction
without the consent of or privity with a respondent).
44. Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Program-forResults Financing, ¶ 7(d) (Feb. 1, 2012); see World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IV, §
4.01(d) (Apr. 15, 2012) (“[T]he Evaluation Officer shall close the matter . . . if the accusations . . . pertain to (i) a Sanctionable Practice in connection with a contract the execution of
which was completed more than ten (10) years prior to the date on which the Statement of
Accusations and Evidence was submitted . . . or (ii) for all other cases, a Sanctionable Practice that took place more than ten (10) years prior to the date on which the Statement of Accusations and Evidence was submitted . . . .”). Respondents sometimes have unsuccessfully
challenged proceedings due to the passage of time. In Sanctions Board Decision No. 64, for
example, the respondent moved to dismiss the proceedings due to the passage of more than
seven years between the last alleged misconduct and the initiation of sanctions proceedings.
Sanctions Board Decision No. 64, ¶ 30 (2014). The Sanctions Board determined that this
did not warrant a summary dismissal, noting that the allegations were not barred by the tenyear statute of limitations, but allowed the respondent to present arguments about the harm
caused by the delay. Id.
45. Anne-Marie Leroy, Advisory Opinion on Certain Issues Arising in Connection with
Recent Sanctions Cases, Opinion No. 2010/1, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY UNIT OF THE WORLD
BANK, at 5 (Nov. 15, 2010).
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tions proceedings are less substantial than those that accompany a more
traditional judicial process. The process includes the following basic aspects:
Complaint Intake and Investigations: The sanctions process typically
begins with receipt of a complaint by INT. Headed by Leonard McCarthy,
an experienced former South African prosecutor, INT’s mandate is to detect, investigate, and seek sanctions with respect to allegations of Sanctionable Practices in Bank-funded activities, including projects funded by
members of the World Bank Group,46 as well as allegations of misconduct
involving Bank staff.47 Because “INT has sole responsibility for selecting
which matters are investigated, conducting objective fact-finding inquiries
and initiating sanctions proceedings when it believes that it has uncovered
sufficient evidence that a contractor has engaged in sanctionable misconduct,”48 it is incredibly influential in setting the Bank’s sanctions agenda.
Reporting directly to the Bank President, INT is composed of approximately 90 staff members from around the world with various legal, law enforcement, and forensic accounting backgrounds—arguably making it the
world’s largest dedicated anti-corruption squad.49 Each year, INT receives
hundreds of complaints, from inside and outside of the Bank.50 INT
screens each complaint to help ensure it implicates a Sanctionable Practice
in Bank-funded activities and is sufficiently serious to warrant an investigation.51 Based on more than 320 of such initial assessments during fiscal
year 2015, INT opened 99 formal investigations, covering 86 countries and

46. See The World Bank Group’s Sanctions Regime: Information Note, at 4 (“INT is
charged with, among other things, investigating allegations and other indications that sanctionable practices have occurred in connection with Bank Group-financed projects.”).
47. The Integrity Vice Presidency FY 13 Facts & Figures (The World Bank, D.C.), at
9. The World Bank Group created the Department of Institutional Integrity in 2001, which
was elevated to a Vice Presidency in 2008.
48. Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, (The World Bank Office of Suspension and Debarment, D.C.) 2015, at 11.
49. See Michael Diamant & Joseph F. Warin, Webcast-World Bank Sanctions and Enforcement: Why You Need to Be Prepared (May 27, 2014), http://www.gibsondunn.com/
publications/Pages/Webcast-World-Bank-Sanctions-and-Enforcement-Why-You-Need-toBe-Prepared.aspx [https://perma.cc/DP2W-8U6E] (presenting practical information on the
World Bank Sanctions and Enforcement of Corruption).
50. See, e.g., FY 14 Annual Update supra note 15, at 30; FY 13 Annual Update supra
note 15, at 2, 5; The Integrity Vice Presidency FY 12 Annual Update (The World Bank,
D.C.), at 32 (describing the complaints receives by the INT).
51. See FY 12 Annual Update supra note 50, at 32; The World Bank, External Investigations,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/
ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTDOII/0,,contentMDK:22641983~menuPK:2452528~p
agePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:588921,00.html
[https://perma.cc/VQX77DYW] (explaining complaint intake process).
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an array of industry sectors.52
While lacking investigative powers traditionally enjoyed by government enforcement authorities, such as subpoena power, INT can leverage
the cooperation of those under scrutiny, as well as Bank contractual auditrights provisions, to employ many traditional investigative techniques, such
as interviews and document review.53 One of the Sanctionable Practices,
obstruction, gives INT a powerful tool to induce cooperation, because it
creates an independent basis to sanction entities that impede investigations,
even if INT cannot substantiate the underlying allegation. Further, INT is
not constricted by the rules of evidence,54 and the standard of proof applicable to INT investigations works to its advantage. Operating under a
more-likely-than-not standard, akin to a “preponderance of the evidence”
standard frequently found in civil cases,55 if INT finds sufficient evidence
to conclude that a Sanctionable Practice occurred, it considers an allegation
to be substantiated and will take further action.56 Although an INT investi52. FY 15 Annual Update supra note 17, at 1, 6, 35.
53. See INT, World Bank Group Settlements: How Negotiated Resolution Agreements
Fit Within the World Bank Group’s Sanctions System (The World Bank, D.C.) 2,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/NoteOnSettlementProcess.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3B3J-8VHS]; (outlining purpose and scope of World Bank sanctions process); David M. Nadler & Glenn T. Ware, The World Bank Implements New Sanctions Procedures, 53 THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR 6, Feb. 9, 2011 at 4 (commenting on new
World Bank Sanctions procedures); The World Bank, Integrity Vice Presidency, Presentation to the ICC 9, https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/65f602a2-a0f6-413a-beedd70f5d091a8f/282330/presentationmccarthy.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P2Z-FPUT] (presenting
the structure and process of the INT). INT’s approach, which is administrative in nature but
implicates important rights, can lead to complex discussions regarding the proper involvement of defense counsel. See World Bank 2013 Phase I Sanctions Review Stakeholder Consultation: Comments of the U.S. Defense Bar, 4 (Oct. 31, 2013),
https://consultations.worldbank.org/Data/hub/files/consultation-template/consultationreview-world-bank-group-sanctionssystemopenconsultationtemplate/materials/us_defense_bar_comments_10_31_13_wb_sanctions_system_review_consul
tation.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PHF-ES7Y].
54. See World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. VII, § 7.01 (Apr. 15, 2012) (“Any kind
of evidence may form the basis of arguments presented in a sanctions proceeding . . . .”).
The Bank does, however, respect the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product
doctrines. Id. § 7.02.
55. Anne-Marie Leroy, Advisory Opinion on Certain Issues Arising in Connection with
Recent Sanctions Cases, Opinion No. 2010/1, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY UNIT OF THE WORLD
BANK, ¶ 45 (Nov. 15, 2010).
56. If an individual or entity engages in factually distinct incidents of misconduct, each
separate incident may be considered separately and sanctioned on a cumulative basis; alternatively, this pattern of behavior may be considered an aggravating factor. World Bank
Sanctioning Guidelines § III (Jan. 1, 2011); see also The World Bank, External Investigations, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION
/ORGUNITS/EXTDOII/0,,contentMDK:22641983~menuPK:2452528~pagePK:64168445~
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gation does not necessarily mean that sanctions will result, there is a high
likelihood that if INT opens an investigation, it will find enough evidence
to meet its thresholds. For example, of the more than 220 investigations
that INT completed in fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015, it found sufficient
evidence of Sanctionable Practices more than 68% of the time.57 Part of
this is attributable to the standard of proof, but INT also has nearly tripled
its substantiation rate in recent years by selecting investigative targets more
carefully.58 The percentage of substantiated investigations has dramatically
increased over the last seven years: FY09 (25.5%), FY10 (17.6%), FY11
(45.8%), FY12 (52.2%), FY13 (67.4%), FY14 (61.8%), FY15 (74%). 59
Before commencing sanctions proceedings, INT may first send the
subject a “show-cause letter.”60 A show-cause letter could well be a company’s first indication that it is on INT’s radar, and the letter could arrive
months after the project at issue is completed. Similar to an SEC Wells notice,61 a show-cause letter sets forth allegations and provides the target an
opportunity to present a written response with arguments and evidence
demonstrating why INT should not seek sanctions against it. Although data are not publicly available regarding the efficacy of such responses, our
experience has been that an effective response can help to narrow the allegations and factual disputes. Responding to the show-cause letter, however, can pose practical challenges, because INT is not obligated at this point
to disclose evidence it possesses.62 A respondent company and its counsel
piPK:64168309~theSitePK:588921,00.html [https://perma.cc/LT2L-YJE9] (“[T]he standard
of proof is akin to a ‘balance of probabilities’ and therefore lower than the criminal standard
of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’”) “Unsubstantiated” allegations, in contrast, are those that
lack sufficient proof, while “unfounded” allegations are those for which INT concludes that
the allegation wholly lacks basis. See FY 14 Annual Update supra note 15, at 31 (outlining
external investigations of the World Bank).
57. FY 15 Annual Update supra note 17, at 37.
58. Id. at 35 (“INT continues to refine its selection process for matters going to full
investigation and has devoted additional resources to more thorough preliminary screening
of allegations before commencing a full investigation.”).
59. FY 13 Facts & Figures supra note 47, at 3, 5; FY 14 Annual Update supra note 15,
at 33; FY 15 Annual Update supra note 17, at 37.
60. INT is not required to issue a show-cause letter before initiating sanctions proceedings. See Sanctions Board Decision No. 81 (Sanctions Case No.215), ¶ 34 (2015) (rejecting
related challenges in cases where INT did not issue one).
61. SEC rules provide that the SEC staff “may advise [persons who become involved
in preliminary inquiries or formal investigations] of the general nature of the investigation,
including the indicated violations . . . and the amount of time that may be available for preparing and submitting [a written statement setting forth their views] prior to the presentation
of a staff recommendation to the Commission for the commencement of an administrative
or injunction proceeding.” 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c).
62. See World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. III, § 3.02 (Apr. 15, 2012) (providing
that INT must provide evidence along with the Statement of Accusations and Evidence).
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therefore may feel as if they are trying to prove a negative. Further, the
possible lack of factual predicate to the allegations may effectively force
the respondent to provide a detailed response, possibly restricting its flexibility in making arguments in its own defense later in the sanctions process.
Indeed, the Sanctions Board may consider a statement made in a response
to a show-cause letter as an admission.63
If INT substantiates an allegation upon conclusion of its investigation,
it will draft a final investigation report.64 The report is provided to the
Bank President and ultimately made publicly available in redacted form on
the Bank’s website.65 In addition to producing the final investigative report, if INT substantiates an allegation it will prepare a document called a
Statement of Accusations and Evidence (“SAE”).66 This document is presented to the Bank’s Chief Suspension and Debarment Officer (“SDO”)
and formally commences the Bank’s administrative sanctions process.67
The SAE can span hundreds of pages, identifies the alleged Sanctionable
Practice(s) at issue, and summarizes the underlying facts and evidence, together with any exculpatory or mitigating evidence.68 In fiscal year 2015,
63. See, e.g., The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 52
(Sanctions Case No. 134), ¶ 30 (2012) (“By the CEO’s own admission in responding to
INT’s show-cause letter, ‘our primary motivation’ in using the agent to quickly secure the
Bid Security was the timely submission of the Bid.”).
64. See FY 14 Annual Update supra note 15, at 33 (detailing final investigation reports).
65. Id.; The World Bank, External Investigations, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTDOII/0,,contentMDK:2
2641983~menuPK:7281670~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:588921,00.htm
l [https://perma.cc/R5YY-M9QR].
66. FY 13 Facts & Figures supra note 47, at 6 (describing SAE); Report on Functions,
Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, (The World Bank Office of Suspension and Debarment, D.C.) 2015, at 11. The IFC and MIGA each have their own Evaluation and Suspension Officers. See The World Bank, Suspension and Debarment Officer / Evaluation and
Suspension Officers, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/
ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTOFFEVASUS/0,,contentMDK:21272397~menuPK:36
01082~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3601046,00.html
[https://perma.cc/A7DH-XJSF] (listing Evaluation and Suspension Officers).
67. Other members of the World Bank Group have their own Evaluation Officers
(“EO”), who perform similar functions with respect to their own sanctions procedures. See,
e.g., IFC Sanctions Procedures, art. II, § 2.01 (“[A] statement of accusations and evidence . . . will be presented to the IFC Evaluation Officer within a maximum period of one
year . . . .”); The World Bank, Sanctions Board Decision No. 76 (Sanctions No. 265) (2015)
(considering a case brought under the IFC Sanctions Procedures in which the IFC EO recommended debarment with conditional release, but concluding that the Sanctions Board was
without jurisdiction to consider the allegations because there lacked a sufficient nexus between the alleged misconduct and the project at issue).
68. See World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. III, § 3.01(b) (Apr. 15, 2012) (explaining referrals process to the IFC Evaluation Officer); World Bank Sanctions and AntiCorruption Efforts Panel Discussion 19 (Oct. 24, 2011). In one decision in which the Sanc-
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INT submitted 29 SAEs to the SDO, fewer than the 45 SAEs it submitted
in fiscal year 2014 but on par with the 33 and 25 SAEs submitted in 2013
and 2012, respectively.69
Our clients frequently ask how long investigations last. INT has
tracked and reported on the average or median number of months it takes
between opening a case and finalizing the investigative report for the past
few years. Although each case differs and these figures do not account for
additional time spent engaging in settlement negotiations or challenging the
allegations through the Bank’s sanctions system, INT’s reported data provide some insight into the typical pace of INT investigations: FY10 (14.5month average),70 FY11 (17.1-month average),71 FY12 (11.5-month median),72 FY13 (16-month median),73 FY14 (12-month median),74 FY15 (13month average).75 Many investigations, however, last several years.76
Temporary Suspensions: Under the Sanctions Procedures, the SDO
may impose a temporary suspension, known as “Early Temporary Suspensions,” before INT actually completes its investigation.77 The World Bank
developed this mechanism in 2009 to address the risk that an entity remains
eligible to bid on Bank-funded projects until it has been formally sanctioned, even if evidence already suggests it committed a Sanctionable Prac-

tions Board determined that INT failed to timely present exculpatory evidence in the SAE,
the Sanctions Board considered whether this failure “compromised the Respondents’ ability
to mount a meaningful response to INT’s allegations.” Sanctions Board Decision No. 81 ¶
36 (2015); see also The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 63
(Sanctions Case No.119, 124), ¶¶ 40–41 (2014) (same). In another, the Sanctions Board
avoided addressing the treatment of exculpatory evidence obtained from a respondent but
not submitted into the record by INT—something the Sanctions Procedures do not specifically address—because the Sanctions Board determined that the evidence was not exculpatory. The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 70 (Sanctions No.
206), ¶¶ 18–19 (2014).
69. FY 15 Annual Update supra note 15, at 38.
70. The Integrity Vice Presidency FY 10 Annual Update, (World Bank Group, D.C.) at
28.
71. The Integrity Vice Presidency FY 11 Annual Update, (World Bank Group, D.C.) at
34.
72. FY 12 Annual Update, at 34.
73. FY 13 Facts & Figures supra note 47, at 5.
74. FY 14 Annual Update supra note 15, at 33.
75. FY 15 Annual Update supra note 17, at 37.
76. See Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, supra note 66, at
36–49 (calculating the periods from the date of the earliest investigative activity to the date
of the submission of the SAE).
77. The World Bank, The World Bank Sanctions Procedures, Early Temporary Suspension
of
Companies
Involved
in
World
Bank-Financed
Projects,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/ETS_Announcement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HL93-Z2SD].
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tice.78 As noted above, the lifecycle of a case, from investigation to sanction, can run for several months, if not for years. Now, the Sanctions Procedures provide that INT can request a temporary suspension from the
SDO before concluding its investigation, which respondents are afforded
an opportunity to contest,79 if it believes that there is sufficient evidence to
support a finding of a Sanctionable Practice and it will successfully complete the investigation and prepare an SAE within one year.80 If the SDO
agrees with INT that there is sufficient evidence and would recommend a
period of debarment of at least two years for such misconduct, then the
SDO is obligated to initiate the temporary suspension.81 A temporarily
suspended entity is debarred from obtaining new Bank-funded business for
a period of six months, which can be extended for an additional six
months.82 Unlike normal suspensions, the cross-debarment agreement
among MDBs does not apply to temporary suspensions.83 Thus far, this
early temporary suspension mechanism has not been used often.84
“Tier One” of the Sanctions Process: The first level of the sanctions
process involves the SDO evaluating the SAE to determine if it is sufficient
to support the allegations.85 Since March 2007, Pascale Hélène Dubois, a
lawyer by training, has served as the World Bank SDO.86 Applying the
same more-likely-than-not standard, the SDO “analyzes the claims made
and the evidence furnished in the SAE, and looks carefully at whether the
claims made by INT adhere to the World Bank’s legal framework.”87 This

78. Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process
and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012 at 12–13; FY
14 Annual Update supra note 15, at 3.
79. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. II, § 2.02 (Apr. 15, 2012).
80. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. II, § 2.01(a) (Apr. 15, 2012).
81. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. II, § 2.01(c) (Apr. 15, 2012).
82. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. II, § 2.04(a) (Apr. 15, 2012).
83. See Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, supra note 66, at
15 (discussing temporary suspensions).
84. See id. at 24 (graphing number of firms/individuals temporarily suspended by
OSD).
85. Id. at 10–11.
86. See Pascale Hélène Dubois, Biography, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/3601045-1373561382853/Pascale_Dubois_CV_
(as_of_August_20,_2014).pdf [https://perma.cc/JEN3-7ARU]. The other members of the
World Bank Group have their own Evaluation and Suspension Officers. See The World
Bank, Suspension and Debarment Officer / Evaluation and Suspension Officers,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORG
UNITS/EXTOFFEVASUS/0,,contentMDK:21272397~menuPK:3601082~pagePK:6416844
5~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3601046,00.html [https://perma.cc/ZAH8-G6YP] (naming
those Officers).
87. Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, supra note 66, at 12.
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review lasts on average two months.88 If the SDO finds insufficient evidence to support one or more of the allegations, she remands the case to
INT, at which point INT can drop the unsupported charges or investigate
further and then send revisions to the SDO.89 Historically, in such instances, INT has taken an average of approximately four months to provide a revised submission to the SDO.90 As an independent function reporting directly to the Bank President, the SDO “serves as an impartial check and
balance on the work of the World Bank’s investigators and endeavors to
ensure a fair and objective process for all parties involved.”91 Indeed, according to a report recently issued by the Bank’s Office of Suspension and
Debarment, the SDO has found insufficient evidence for at least one allegation in more than one-third of cases she reviewed.92
If the SDO finds sufficient evidence supporting a Sanctionable Practice, she will issue a document to the entity called a Notice of Sanctions
Proceedings.93 The Notice will include the SAE, a recommended sanction,
and instructions about how to contest the accusations.94 Further, if the recommended sanction includes a period of debarment of more than six
months, the respondent is automatically suspended pending the conclusion
of the proceedings, which will typically be the case.95
After delivery of the Notice, the respondent has thirty days to provide
the SDO with a written “Explanation” as to why the Notice should be withdrawn or the recommended sanction modified.96 Because the Notice actually includes INT’s evidence, the Explanation presents an important opportunity for effective advocacy to challenge the evidence, theories of liability,
and the sanction. In fact, the SDO can (1) “withdraw the Notice upon concluding that there is a manifest error or other clear basis for supporting a
finding of insufficiency of evidence against the Respondent” or (2) “revise
the recommended sanction in light of evidence or arguments as to mitigating factors presented by the Respondent.”97 The Notice must attach the
SAE, and presents a Respondent’s first opportunity to contest the allega88. Id. at 48.
89. Id. at 12.
90. Id. at 48.
91. Id. at 11.
92. Id. at 11, 30. However, in 95% of cases, the SDO has determined that there was
sufficient evidence for at least one of the claims made by INT. Id. at 30.
93. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IV, § 4.01 (Apr. 15, 2012).
94. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IV, § 4.01(b) (Apr. 15, 2012).
95. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IV, § 4.02(a) (Apr. 15, 2012); see Report on
Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, supra note 66, at 23 (presenting overall
OSD case management statistics).
96. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IV, § 4.02(b) (Apr. 15, 2012).
97. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IV, § 4.03(a) (Apr. 15, 2012).
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tions before the SDO. It thus is somewhat surprising that only about onethird of respondents have submitted Explanations in response to Notices.98
This may be attributable historically to respondents that are unrepresented
by counsel or unfamiliar with the sanctions process.
In addition to submitting an Explanation, the respondent has ninety
days after delivery of the Notice to appeal the case to the World Bank’s
Sanctions Board.99 Otherwise, the SDO’s recommended sanction “shall enter immediately into force,”100 and it will be published on the World Bank’s
public website. Most cases end at this level; historically, only forty percent
of respondents have appealed to the Sanctions Board.101 And according to
a recent review by the Bank’s Legal Vice Presidency, of the respondents
that did not appeal to the Sanctions Board, more than 90% of the cases involved respondents that simply failed to respond at all to the Notice.102
“Tier Two” of the Sanctions Process: The Sanctions Board is composed of seven members, including four external members and three senior
Bank officials, each serving three-year terms.103 Its external members are a
diverse and impressive group and currently include the first woman Justice
and President of the Supreme Court of Brazil, a former Judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, and the former General Counsel of the Inter-American Development Bank.104 A respondent initiates an appeal by
submitting a written response to the allegations and recommended sanction.105 Upon request of the respondent or INT, or upon decision of the
Sanctions Board Chair, “the Sanctions Board will hold a hearing on the accusations against the Respondent.”106 Hearings are intended to be informal—with a presentation by INT of its case, a presentation by the respondent of its case, and a reply by INT—and limited to arguments and evidence
98. Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, supra note 66, at 15
n.35; see also The World Bank Group: World Bank Sanctions and Anti-Corruption Efforts
Panel Discussion 22 (Oct. 24, 2011) (noting that the SDO receives an Explanation in only
28% of cases) (on file with author).
99. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. V, § 5.01(a) (Apr. 15, 2012).
100. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IV, § 4.04 (Apr. 15, 2012).
101. Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, supra note 66, 31
(2014).
102. Frank Fariello & Giovanni Bo, The World Bank Group Sanctions System and Access to Justice for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises, 5 THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW
at 424.
103. World Bank Sanctions Board Statute, art. V, ¶ 5 (Sept. 15, 2010).
104. The World Bank, Sanctions Board Members, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTOFFEVASUS/0,,conte
ntMDK:21272308~menuPK:3601081~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3601
046,00.html [https://perma.cc/LY9U-9EWH] (last visited Dec. 26, 2015).
105. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. V, § 5.01 (Apr. 15, 2012).
106. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. VI, § 6.01 (Apr. 15, 2012).
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in the written submissions filed with the SDO and/or the Sanctions Board,
evidence relating to mitigating or aggravating factors, questions from the
Sanctions Board, and limited opportunities for testimony.107 The Sanctions
Board conducts de novo review of cases appealed to it based on the record
and renders a final decision about whether a sanction should be imposed.108
Applying the same more-likely-than-not standard, if the Sanctions Board
finds that the respondent engaged in Sanctionable Practices, it must impose
sanctions.109 The Sanctions Board also issues written decisions, and it began publishing new decisions on the Bank’s public website in December
2011.110
Sanctions Board decisions offer important insights about the Sanctions
Board’s approach to evidence. First, even if no single piece of evidence,
standing alone, suffices to show misconduct, the cumulative weight of evidence may do so.111 This approach was apparent in a decision in which the
Sanctions Board found that a director’s silence during a meeting by itself
failed to establish acquiescence in the offering of a bribe, but was sufficient
“when viewed together with evidence of the [director’s] statements in a
[later] June 2006 meeting, and – most importantly – the Director’s continued silence during email negotiations for the potential reallocation of Contract proceeds.”112 Second, the Sanctions Board generally discounts, but
does not necessarily preclude, witness testimony of business competitors or
even accomplices.113 In Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, representatives
107. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. VI, § 6.03(b) (Apr. 15, 2012).
108. Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process
and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012, at 3.
109. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. VIII, § 8.01(b) (Apr. 15, 2012).
110. INT, World Bank Group Settlements: How Negotiated Resolution Agreements Fit
Within the World Bank Group’s Sanctions System 3, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTDOII/Resources/NoteOnSettlementProcess.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JF3J-32ZB];
The
World Bank, Sanctions Board Decisions, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTOFFEVASUS/0,,conte
ntMDK:23059612~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3601046,00.html
[https://perma.cc/9H6Q-UCGE] (last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
111. The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 28 (2012).
112. Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 34 (2012).
113. See Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 39 (2012) (“In assessing the weight of witness statements, the Sanctions Board takes into account all relevant factors bearing on the
witness’s credibility, including whether the witness is a business competitor and whether
such witness may have been involved in any sanctionable practices. The fact that testimony
comes from a competitor may discount its value, depending on the circumstances, but will
not necessarily preclude its use. Similarly, a witness’s own involvement in the misconduct
at issue should be considered, but it would not necessarily preclude use of that witness’s testimony or even primary reliance upon it, where appropriate.”). In Sanctions Board Decision
No. 1, the Sanctions Board noted that confidential witness statements from competitors are
“significantly discounted” if INT inexplicably withholds such evidence from the respondent.
Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty, SANCTIONS
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of a firm provided testimony to INT regarding a payment scheme.114 The
Sanctions Board noted that the firm’s status as a competitor to the respondent and its own potential involvement in corruption “call[ed] for extra scrutiny of [their] reliability as witnesses.”115 Further diminishing the competitor’s credibility was the fact that INT interviewed the representatives
together, which the Sanctions Board observed “may compromise the candor of each individual’s testimony, and does not permit for cross-checking
of each witness’s separate statement against other witnesses’ statements.”116
In such circumstances, the Sanctions Board frequently looks for documentary evidence to corroborate witness testimony.117 In Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, for example, the Sanctions Board found that a representative’s handwritten meeting notes and subsequent email correspondence
supported the witness’s credibility.118 Indeed, the Sanctions Board has
even primarily relied on the testimony of a witness involved in the bribery
scheme at issue where the witness provided “detailed, candid admissions
against [his] self-interest, which were corroborated by contemporaneous
documentation and other witnesses.”119
Respondents have had some success before the Sanctions Board. In
the Sanctions Board’s first five years of existence, for example, fifty-one
respondents had appeals decided by the Sanctions Board; fifteen (twentynine percent) ultimately received no sanction.120 Further, even where it
finds culpability, the Sanctions Board often imposes a period of debarment
that is shorter than what is recommended by the SDO.121 This is partly a
BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 34 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 1, ¶ 7 (2007)). Notably, this is the only decision in which the Sanctions Board
found insufficient evidence of a Corrupt Practice.
114. Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 40 (2012).
115. Id.
116. Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 40 (2012). Also, as discussed above, the Sanctions Board noted that the weight of the witnesses’ testimony was further compromised by
the fact that INT only proffered summary interviews (as opposed to verbatim transcripts)
that were not reviewed and signed by the interviewees. Id.
117. See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 40 (2012) (justifying extra scrutiny of
witnesses because of their improper arrangements with Implementing Agency); The World
Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 41, ¶ 32 (2010).
118. Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 40 (2012).
119. Id. (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 41, ¶ 32 (2010)).
120. Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 21.
121. See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 65, ¶¶ 2, 86 (2014) (describing how the
SDO recommended conditional debarments of four years and two years, respectively, and
the Sanctions Board imposed a two-year conditional debarment and letter of reprimand, respectively); The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 56, ¶¶ 4, 89
(2013) (describing how the SDO recommended a conditional debarment of three years, but
the Sanctions Board imposed a one-year conditional debarment).
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result of the period of any temporary suspension already served. The Sanctions Procedures instruct the Sanctions Board to consider this as a factor in
determining the appropriate sanction.122 As noted above, some respondents
will have been temporarily suspended pending the conclusion of INT’s investigation or automatically suspended following the SDO’s review, and it
takes an average of six to eight months from filing the appeal to the Sanctions Board’s decision.123
Settlements: Companies and enforcement authorities alike often favor
settlements over the time, cost, and uncertainty inherent in the adversarial
process,124 and the World Bank’s sanctions process is no exception. Starting in 2010, the World Bank has offered a settlement possibility through
what it calls a Negotiated Resolution Agreement (“NRA”).125 The World
Bank allows that a “settlement may be pursued at any stage of an investigation or sanctions proceeding.”126 These agreements replace formal sanctions proceedings and allow the respondent and INT to negotiate an agreedupon sanction. Many of the terms contained in NRAs might vary, but they
generally require certain key terms. For instance, an NRA likely will contain an admission of culpability, compliance conditions (such as an obligation to improve a corporate compliance program in accordance with the
World Bank’s Integrity Compliance Guidelines),127 imposition of a compliance monitor, and obligations to cooperate with INT in various respects
during the period of sanction. Although INT drafts and negotiates NRAs,
before becoming effective, they must be approved by the Bank’s General
Counsel and reviewed by the SDO.128 NRAs represent only a fraction of
122. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IX, § 9.02(h) (Apr. 15, 2012).
123. Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 21.
124. See generally F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Melissa Farrar, 2014 YearEnd Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements and Deferred Prosecution Agreements, SECURITIES REGULATION & LAW REPORT, 47 SRLR 332 (Feb. 16, 2015),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Warin_Diamant_Farrar-2014-YearEnd-Update-on-NPAs-and-DPAs-BNA-2.16.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/83ZS-2A2G].
125. Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process
and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012 at 20.
126. INT, World Bank Group Settlements: How Negotiated Resolution Agreements Fit
Within the World Bank Group’s Sanctions System 3, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTDOII/Resources/NoteOnSettlementProcess.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NQQ-29JQ].
127. The Integrity Compliance Guidelines describe a non-exclusive set of “standards,
principles and components commonly recognized by many institutions and entities as good
governance and anti-fraud and corruption practices” which must be adequately implemented
before debarment or conditional non-debarment is lifted. The World Bank, The Summary of
World Bank Group Integrity Compliance Guidelines, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTDOII/Resources/Integrity_Compliance_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/APK6-ASAG].
128. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. XI, § 11.02 (Apr. 15, 2012); INT, World
Bank Group Settlements: How Negotiated Resolution Agreements Fit Within the World
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the cases resolved by INT, with eleven in fiscal year 2011, sixteen in fiscal
year 2012, eight in fiscal year 2013, six in fiscal year 2014, and eleven in
fiscal year 2015. Nevertheless, they have been used to resolve some of the
Bank’s highest-profile investigations.129
Sanctions: The World Bank—whether the SDO or the Sanctions
Board—can impose five types of possible sanctions: (1) letter of reprimand, (2) debarment for a definite or indefinite period, (3) conditional nondebarment, (4) debarment with conditional release, and (5) restitution.130 A
series of enumerated aggravating or mitigating factors can increase or decrease the sanction.131
REPRIMAND. In cases of “truly minor misconduct or peripheral involvement,” such as where a party commits an isolated lack of oversight, a
public letter of reprimand may be appropriate.132
DEBARMENT. The World Bank will debar a party where “no appreciable purpose would be served by imposing conditions for release but deterrence requires some period of debarment,” after which the debarment is
automatically lifted.133 The Sanctioning Guidelines identify situations in
which “there would be no reasonable purpose served by imposing conditions” as including instances where the sanctioned party already has in
place a strong compliance program, where the Sanctionable Practice inBank Group’s Sanctions System 4, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/ Resources/NoteOnSettlementProcess.pdf [https://perma.cc/DP29-KFQV].
129. FY 14 Annual Update, at 34; FY 15 Annual Update at 38; Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, (The World Bank Office of Suspension and Debarment,
D.C.) 2015, at 23; Press Release, The World Bank, World Bank Debars SNC-Lavalin Inc.
and its Affiliates for 10 years (Apr. 17, 2013) (“The debarment is part of a Negotiated Resolution Agreement . . . .”); Press Release, Enforcing Accountability: World Bank Debars Alstom Hydro France, Alstom Network Schweiz AG, and their Affiliates (Feb. 22, 2012).
130. Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process
and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012, at 4-5;
World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IX, § 9.01 (Apr. 15, 2012).
131. Aggravating factors include the severity of the misconduct (one to five year increase), the harm caused by the misconduct (one to five year increase), interference with
INT’s investigation (one to three year increase), and a past history of adjudicated misconduct (ten year increase). Mitigating factors include having a minor role in the misconduct
(up to twenty-five percent decrease), taking voluntary corrective action (up to fifty percent
decrease, or more in exceptional circumstances), and cooperating with the investigation (up
to thirty-three percent decrease, or more in exceptional circumstances). World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines §§ I, IV, V (Jan. 1, 2011).
132. Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process
and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012 at 5; World
Bank Sanctioning Guidelines § II(D) (Jan. 1, 2011); see, e.g., The World Bank Sanctions
Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 67 (2014) (describing the appropriateness of a letter
of reprimand).
133. Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process
and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012 at 4.
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volved isolated acts of personnel who have been terminated, and where the
proposed debarment is for a relatively short period.134
DEBARMENT WITH CONDITIONAL RELEASE. Under the Sanctioning
Guidelines, the baseline sanction for all Sanctionable Practices is a threeyear debarment with conditional release, which means that the debarred entity will be released from sanction only after it has satisfied certain conditions. Conditions typically include the implementation or improvement of
a satisfactory corporate compliance program.135 The Bank’s Integrity
Compliance Office, which sits within INT but is administratively separate
from the investigations function, is tasked with monitoring implementation
and deciding whether the conditions have been satisfied.136
CONDITIONAL NON-DEBARMENT. Here, by contrast, a party is not debarred so long as it complies with certain conditions. Conditional nondebarment may be appropriate for parties that are affiliated with a respondent and were not directly involved in the misconduct but have some responsibility or have demonstrated that they “have taken comprehensive
corrective measures and that such other mitigating factors apply . . . so as to
justify non-debarment.”137
RESTITUTION. Restitution and other financial remedies “may be used
in exceptional circumstances, including those involving fraud in contract
execution where there is a quantifiable amount to be restored to the client
country or project.”138
II.

SANCTIONABLE PRACTICES

The Procurement Guidelines define the five Sanctionable Practices,
and the Sanctions Board has further refined their meanings and application,
and developed precedent by applying them to specific factual circumstances. Much like the written opinions of national courts of law, Sanctions
Board decisions provide factual findings, summarize the various arguments
and factual assertions of the parties, apply the applicable standards and analyze their merits, and reach conclusions, sometimes even including a dissenting opinion.139 Not all Sanctions Board decisions, however, are availa134. World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines § II(B) (Jan. 1, 2011).
135. Id. Starting punishment for all Sanctionable Practices at the same level—for instance, a bribe to obtain a project versus a non-intentional, immaterial inaccuracy in bid materials—may lead to results that cause entities that engage in objectively less culpable conduct to question the calibration of the process.
136. Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process
and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012 at 16–17.
137. World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines § II(C) (Jan. 1, 2011).
138. World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines § II(F) (Jan. 1, 2011).
139. See Sanctions Board Decision No. 81 (2015) (D. Robitaille dissenting op.) (repre-
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ble to the public. Of the seventy-five Board decisions rendered through the
end of 2014, thirty-four had been fully published, with an additional eight
decisions published in 2015.140 Twenty more decisions, issued before December 2011, are summarized in the Sanctions Board Law Digest.141 Relying on available Sanctions Board decisions, the following subsections analyze both the required elements of each Sanctionable Practice and the types
of evidence the Sanction Board has considered in assessing culpability. In
addition to providing a synthesis and analysis of the contours of each Sanctionable Practice, this section draws parallels to more established laws and
regulations in an effort to develop this relatively new area of law.
A. Obstructive Practice
The various versions of the Procurement Guidelines have defined an
Obstructive Practice to encompass two types of behavior:
• “[D]eliberately destroying, falsifying, altering, or concealing
of evidence material to the investigation or making false
statements to investigators in order to materially impede a
Bank investigation into allegations of a corrupt, fraudulent,
coercive or collusive practice; and/or threatening, harassing or
intimidating any party to prevent it from disclosing its
knowledge of matters relevant to the investigation or from
pursuing the investigation”; or
• “[A]cts intended to materially impede the exercise of the
Bank’s inspection and audit rights provided for under [a
clause required to] be included in bidding documents and in
contracts financed by a Bank loan, requiring bidders, suppliers
and contractors, and their subcontractors, agents, personnel,
consultants, service providers, or suppliers, to permit the Bank
to inspect all accounts, records, and other documents relating
to the submission of bids and contract performance, and to

senting an example of a dissenting opinion). Article XIV of the Sanctions Board Statute and
§ 20(1) of the Sanctions Procedures provide that Sanctions Board decisions are final and
unappealable. Sanctions Board Decision No. 80, ¶ 5 (2015). Nevertheless, the Sanctions
Board may recognize exceptional circumstances, such as newly discovered evidence, allowing it to reconsider a final decision. Id.
140. The World Bank, Sanction Board Decisions, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTOFFEVASUS/0,,conte
ntMDK:23059612~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3601046,00.html
[https://perma.cc/EL34-PKCX] (last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
141. Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 25-32.
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have them audited by auditors appointed by the Bank.”142
The precedent regarding Obstructive Practices is limited. As of the
publication of the Law Digest in October 2011, the Sanctions Board had
not reviewed an obstruction case.143 Since then, however, the Sanctions
Board has issued two publicly available opinions that consider Obstructive
Practices.144 Further, although the creation of Obstructive Practices as a
Sanctionable Practice in 2006 suggests that it was intended as a standalone
deterrent to prevent firms from so severely obstructing an investigation that
no other Sanctionable Practice could be proven,145 the Sanctions Board has
not yet reviewed a case in which the sole allegation is that a respondent engaged in an Obstructive Practice—in these cases, another Sanctionable
Practice was instead the core allegation. Five opinions review obstructive
behavior that has been characterized by INT as an aggravating factor—
rather than an independent Sanctionable Practice—that should influence
the severity of the sanction imposed. Though an Obstructive Practice is a
standalone Sanctionable Practice, interference with INT’s investigation remains one of the enumerated aggravating factors in the Sanctioning Guidelines, and can lead to a one-to-three-year increase in the sanction.
The definition of Obstructive Practices in the Procurement Guidelines
is similar to that of the “interference with investigative process” aggravating factor present in the Sanctioning Guidelines, but differs from it in an
important way: like Obstructive Practices, which include “acts intended to
materially impede the exercise of the Bank’s inspection and audit rights,”
the aggravating factor applies to “acts intended to materially impede the
exercise of the Bank’s contractual rights of audit.” The language of the aggravating factor also includes, however, “acts intended to materially impede . . . the Bank’s . . . access to information.”146 Notably, the AntiCorruption Guidelines define an Obstructive Practice consistent with the
Sanctioning Guidelines’ aggravating factor—as “acts intended to materially
impede the exercise of the Bank’s contractual rights of audit or access to
information.”147 Despite the different definitions, the aggravating factor
cases provide additional insight into the interpretation of Obstructive Prac142. World Bank Procurement Guidelines §§ 1.16(a)(v)(bb), 1.16(e) (Jan. 2011 rev. July
2014).
143. Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 22.
144. The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 60 (2013); The
World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 77 (2015).
145. See Sanctions Reform: Expansion of Sanctions Regime Beyond Procurement and
Sanctioning of Obstructive Practices (The World Bank, D.C.) Aug. 1, 2006 at 5 (informing
borrowers of reforms).
146. World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines § IV(C) 1 (Jan. 11, 2011).
147. World Bank Anti-Corruption Guidelines § 7(e) (Oct. 15, 2006, rev. Jan. 2011).
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tices. Of course, in these cases INT has made a decision to charge the behavior as only an aggravating factor, suggesting some level of discretion.
Notably, one of the Sanctions Board’s two Obstructive Practices decisions found that INT failed to present sufficient evidence. In Sanctions
Board Decision No. 77, the principal allegation was that the respondent engaged in fraud by submitting allegedly false documents in a proposal.148
The respondent argued that the allegedly false submission should not be attributed to it because it was made by an unauthorized individual.149 In support of its defense, the respondent submitted two power-of-attorney documents that it had given to the individual for other matters and pointed to
differences in the “alleged” signature on the allegedly false documents and
those on the powers of attorney.150 Believing that the so-presented powerof-attorney documents were actually themselves fabricated, however, INT
alleged that the respondent “engaged in an obstructive practice by deliberately fabricating two documents constituting material evidence in order to
impede INT’s investigation.”151
The Sanctions Board confirmed that it would analyze Obstructive
Practices similarly to how it reviews the “interference with investigative
process” aggravating factor and set out the following two elements: INT
must show that it is more likely than not that (1) the respondent deliberately
falsified evidence, and (2) that is material to the investigation in order to
materially impede a Bank investigation into allegations of a [Sanctionable
Practice].”152
In finding that INT failed to meet its burden on the first element, the
Sanctions Board noted that INT had not presented any evidence that the
documents were fabricated nor anything to suggest any indicia of inauthenticity on the face of the documents.153 Nor did the Sanctions Board itself
see any such indicia, observing that the documents appeared to have original stamps and signatures.154 Because INT did not satisfy the first element,
the Sanctions Board did not need to consider whether the documents were
148. Sanctions Board Decision No. 77, ¶ 8 (2015).
149. Id. at ¶ 17.
150. Id. at ¶ 18.
151. Id. at ¶ 8.
152. Id. at ¶ 38. Although the Sanctions Board did not do so, adopting an alternative
approach would have been to divide the second element into two sub-elements—(a) the evidence is material to the investigation and (b) was deliberately destroyed, falsified, altered, or
concealed in order to materially impede a Bank investigation. The Sanctions Board’s brief
analysis of the second prong does consider separately whether the falsified evidence was
material to the investigation, and then whether it was falsified in order to materially impede
a Bank investigation. See id. ¶ 43 (stating that the Sanctions Board need not consider
whether falsification was intended to materially impede the investigation).
153. Id. at ¶ 41.
154. Id.
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material to the Bank’s investigation or whether any falsification was intended to materially impede the investigation.155
In the second Obstructive Practices decision, the Sanctions Board
concluded that the intentional deletion of documents relevant to an INT inquiry was sanctionable. In Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, INT alleged,
among other things, that certain respondents “engaged in obstructive practices by deleting email correspondence relevant to INT’s investigation.”156
In particular, INT alleged that, in anticipation of INT’s arrival for an audit,
a manager intentionally deleted emails showing that someone had received
confidential information from a procurement advisor regarding contracts
for a Bank-financed project. The respondent admitted that the emails were
deleted before INT’s audit despite understanding that they could be relevant to the audit, but argued that the deletion had no material negative effect on INT’s investigation.157 Nevertheless, the Sanctions Board found
sufficient evidence. The timing of the deletions suggested that they were
intended to impede the investigation, and the Sanctions Board observed
that “at least some [of the deleted] emails related to [the respondent’s]
communications with the Procurement Advisor and therefore were material
to the investigation.”158
The Sanctions Board, in the aggravating-factor cases, has declined to
find aggravation absent evidence that the spoliation was intentional. In
Sanctions Board Decision No. 61, INT again claimed that the respondents
interfered with its investigation by deliberately destroying emails.159 Here,
however, the respondents claimed that a technical issue caused the unintentional loss of emails. Although skeptical of the timing of the email loss, the
Sanctions Board concluded that the record lacked “sufficient evidence . . .
that any of the Respondents instructed or participated in any deliberate destruction or concealment of evidence.”160
155. Id. at ¶ 43.
156. Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 12 (2013).
157. Id. at ¶ 104.
158. Id. at ¶ 105. Notably, the SDO in this case had “recognized the alleged obstruction
to be temporary and de minimis and largely outweighed by the significant cooperation that
the relevant Respondents provided to INT.” Id. at ¶ 104. The Sanctions Board, however,
neither expounded on its holding nor explained why it departed from the SDO’s assessment.
In contrast to the SDO, the Sanctions Board disregarded the respondents’ cooperation with
INT in this analysis, noting that “such cooperation could be mitigating but not exculpatory.”
Id. at ¶ 105.
159. The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 61, ¶ 12 (2013).
160. Id. at ¶ 38. INT also asserted that the respondents made misleading statements
about the supposed destruction. Because the Sanctions Board did not find it “more likely
than not that the emails were deliberately destroyed, it conclude[d] that the Respondents’
alternative explanations regarding the missing emails d[id] not warrant aggravation as false
statements to INT.” Id. at ¶ 39.
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On its face, the definition of Obstructive Practices under the World
Bank Procurement Guidelines should not allow for culpability when no
contractual provision grants INT a right to inspect or audit. Again, the definition prohibits acts “intended to materially impede the exercise of the
Bank’s inspection and audit rights provided for under [a clause required to]
be included in bidding documents and in contracts financed by a Bank loan,
requiring bidders, suppliers and contractors, and their subcontractors,
agents, personnel, consultants, service providers, or suppliers, to permit the
Bank to inspect all accounts, records, and other documents relating to the
submission of bids and contract performance, and to have them audited by
auditors appointed by the Bank.”161 But the definition of Obstructive Practices under the World Bank Anti-Corruption Guidelines may allow for such
culpability, covering “acts intended to materially impede the exercise of the
Bank’s contractual rights of audit or access to information.”162 The latter
three words can be read either to suggest that culpability can attach independent of any contractual right of audit, where general “access to information” has been obstructed, or that a contractual right of audit is a prerequisite. The 2006 report establishing Obstructive Practices supports the
former interpretation. It notes that Obstructive Practices would “provide[]
a means for enforcing the Bank’s third-party rights and a mechanism for
discouraging firms from non-cooperation in circumstances where there are
no contractual rights or where those rights have lapsed.”163 If it confronts
an Obstructive Practices case under the World Bank Anti-Corruption
Guidelines, the Sanctions Board could easily disagree with this position,
however, because it would render the “contractual rights of audit” language
in the definition practically redundant.
Aggravating-factor opinions offer some help in parsing the language,
and have generally focused on the specific scope of the Bank’s audit rights
rather than giving the phrase “access to information” the broadest possible
meaning. In Sanctions Board Decision No. 63, INT alleged that one of the
respondents impeded the Bank’s audit by refusing to provide INT access to
joint venture correspondence and other documents.164 The Sanctions Board
concluded that INT failed to establish that the respondent’s narrow interpretation of the Bank’s audit rights under the contract constituted deliberate
161. World Bank Procurement Guidelines §§ 1.16(a)(v)(bb), 1.16(e) (Jan. 2011, rev.
July 2014).
162. World Bank Anti-Corruption Guidelines § 7(e) (Oct. 15, 2006, rev. Jan. 2011)
(emphasis added).
163. Sanctions Reform: Expansion of Sanctions Regime Beyond Procurement and Sanctioning of Obstructive Practices (The World Bank, D.C.) Aug. 1, 2006 at 5(emphasis added).
164. Sanctions Board Decision No. 63, ¶¶ 16, 35 (2014).

1014

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 18:4

interference.165 Had it read the definition of the aggravating factor more
broadly, the Sanctions Board could have found aggravation warranted
based on the respondent’s refusal to provide INT with “access to information.” But the Sanctions Board fit the respondent’s obligations to the
scope of the Bank’s audit rights. Because the respondent refused to provide documents outside the scope of the Bank’s audit rights, no deliberate
interference occurred. This outcome is logical given that the entire sanctions regime at the World Bank is rooted in contract. Again, to hold otherwise would render audit clauses practically unnecessary.
Likewise, in Sanctions Board Decision No. 56, INT argued that the respondents deserved an enhanced sanction for interfering with and obstructing its investigation. INT argued that the respondents impeded the Bank’s
audit rights by denying INT access to relevant information.166 The respondents countered that the audit rights did not encompass information
that pre-dated the signing of the relevant contract and objected to INT’s inquiries into earlier events. The Sanctions Board sided with INT, but, importantly, did so by relying on an expansive reading of the Bank’s audit
rights under the contract (as opposed to some general right to investigate).
It interpreted the audit clause to require the respondents to allow the Bank
to inspect all accounts and records related to the services provided in the
contract. The Sanctions Board determined that this language covered relevant pre-contract activity.167
The same reasoning, but a different outcome, is found in Sanctions
Board Decision No. 71, in which INT alleged that the respondent impeded
the Bank’s audit rights.168 The respondent here also argued that “INT’s audit request was unreasonable and exceeded the scope of INT’s rights.”169
Because the record did not contain any evidence “that would have clarified
the scope of INT’s request and supported INT’s allegation,”170 the Sanctions Board found no basis for aggravation. Here, the Sanctions Board
could not properly assess the request to determine if it fell within the scope
of the Bank’s audit rights.
Beyond access to documents, the Sanctions Board also has considered
the application of interference to situations involving INT’s access to employees. The scope of INT’s authority in this area is hotly contested. In
Sanctions Board Decision No. 69, INT argued for interference as an aggravating factor alleging that it met with the respondent’s representatives three
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at ¶ 103.
Sanctions Board Decision No. 56, ¶¶ 13, 15(iii), 61 (2013).
Id. at ¶ 62.
The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 71, ¶ 88 (2014).
Id.
Id.
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times but they repeatedly refused to answer questions about documents relevant to the investigation.171 The Sanctions Board concluded that aggravation was not warranted, because “INT [did] not allege that the Respondent
engaged in any overt acts that interfered with INT’s investigation, which
are the types of acts that the Sanctioning Guidelines suggest would warrant
aggravation under this factor,” and because “the record reveals at least a
certain degree of responsiveness on the part of the Respondent.”172
1. Obstruction as an Aggravating Factor or Sanctionable Practice
The severity of the misconduct and the strength of evidence available
to INT seem to play a role in INT’s decision whether to charge an Obstructive Practice or merely to allege interference as an aggravating factor. Perhaps the clearest comparison can be made between Sanctions Board Decisions Nos. 60 and 61. Both decisions addressed a respondent’s deletion of
emails material to INT’s investigation, but the deletion in Sanctions Board
Decision No. 60 was alleged to be an Obstructive Practice in itself, whereas
the same act was characterized as an aggravating factor in Sanctions Board
Decision No. 61. In Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, in addition to alleging that the respondents had engaged in corruption and fraud, INT alleged
that the respondents engaged in obstruction when “[a] Respondent Director
instructed [a] Respondent Project Manager to delete emails [relevant to the
investigation].”173 A respondent commercial manager confirmed that
emails had been deliberately deleted before INT’s arrival but argued that
the deletion was a “panicked prior reaction which [Respondent] overcame
and corrected, and which had no material . . . effect on the . . . investigation,” and that the conduct was “outweighed by the significant cooperation
that the relevant Respondents provided to INT.”174 The Sanctions Board
rejected these arguments, noting that regardless of any later regret, the
emails were deleted with the intent to impede INT’s investigation, and any
subsequent cooperation with the investigation could not serve to be exculpatory but may only be considered as a mitigating factor.175
In Sanctions Board Decision No. 61, in addition to alleging that the
respondent had engaged in fraud, INT argued that the respondent had deleted emails that implicated it in the fraud.176 The respondent argued that a
171. The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 69, ¶ 37 (2014).
172. Id.; see generally Sanctions Board Decision No. 81, ¶¶ 31–33 (2015) (finding that
there was insufficient evidence to conclude it was more likely than not that the respondents
engaged in the alleged fraudulent practice).
173. Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 104 (2013).
174. Id.
175. Id. at ¶ 105.
176. Sanctions Board Decision No. 61, ¶ 38 (2013).
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technical issue caused the unintentional loss of emails.177 Despite the apparent lack of any credible explanation for the timing of the loss of emails
shortly before INT’s fieldwork and the fact that the respondent was only
able to recover one potentially exculpatory email, the Sanctions Board held
that the record did not include sufficient evidence to support a finding that
it was more likely than not that the respondents deliberately destroyed evidence.178
In both Obstructive Practice and aggravating factor cases, Sanctions
Board decisions suggest that the mens rea requirement is difficult to establish. Again, the World Bank Procurement Guidelines define an Obstructive
Practice as one done “in order to materially impede a Bank investigation”
or as “acts intended to materially impede the exercise of the Bank’s inspection and audit rights.”179 The Sanctioning Guidelines’ aggravating factor
definition (and the Anti-Corruption Guidelines) uses the same language,
while also including “acts intended to materially impede the exercise of the
Bank’s . . . access to information.”180
Therefore, INT must show that it is more likely than not that a respondent engaged in the purported misconduct with the intent to materially
impede a Bank investigation or the Bank’s contractual rights. In Sanctions
Board Decision No. 60, discussed above, the only Board decision to find
that the required mens rea of Obstructive Practice was present, the respondent admitted to deleting emails to impede the Bank’s investigation.181
Conversely, in Sanctions Board Decision No. 61, even considering the timing of the purported system failure and the firm’s ability to recover only
one potentially exculpatory document, the Sanctions Board found insufficient evidence that the respondent intended to impede the Bank’s contractual rights or access to information.
2. Roots of Obstructive Practices in Sarbanes-Oxley
The precedent regarding Obstructive Practices is limited, and therefore
it is also worth considering the history behind its adoption. The Bank
adopted Obstructive Practices as a new Sanctionable Practice in 2006 to
reach certain acts not covered by the Bank’s then-existing prohibitions on
fraud, corruption, collusion, and coercion.182 The Bank was concerned that
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. World Bank Procurement Guidelines § 1.16(a)(v)(bb) (Jan. 2011, rev. July 2014).
180. World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines § IV(C)1 (Jan. 11, 2011); World Bank AntiCorruption Guidelines § 7(e) (Oct. 15, 2006, rev. Jan. 2011).
181. Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 104 (2013).
182. See generally Sanctions Reform: Expansion of Sanctions Regime Beyond Procurement and Sanctioning of Obstructive Practices (The World Bank, D.C.) Aug. 1, 2006 (set-
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“the destruction [of evidence] could only be used as an aggravating factor
in the determination of sanctions, and only if the Bank were able to prove
the underlying offense.”183 In other words, an entity could theoretically
avoid sanctions altogether simply by sufficiently obstructing INT’s investigation.
According to a 2006 report, the Bank consulted the laws of several
countries in devising its prohibition on Obstructive Practices.184 The Bank
specifically highlighted Section 802 of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(“SOX”) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1519).185 Therefore, a firm plausibly
could draw on precedents from the application of § 1519 in mounting a defense to an Obstructive Practice charge.
Among its extensive reshaping of U.S. securities regulation, SOX introduced a new “anti-shredding” provision. Crafted in broad terms, this
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, provides as follows:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence
the investigation or proper administration of any matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States . . . or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or
case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both.186
Some commentators have described changes wrought by § 1519 as
providing prosecutors with “greater power, lower requirements of proof,
and increased penalties” as compared to previous obstruction-of-justice
provisions.187 Presently, the text, legislative history,188 and judicial con-

ting forth new sanctionable practices).
183. Id. at 5.
184. Sanctions Reform: Expansion of Sanctions Regime Beyond Procurement and Sanctioning of Obstructive Practices (The World Bank, D.C.) July 28, 2006 at 14 n.24.
185. Id.
186. Sanctions Reform: Expansion of Sanctions Regime Beyond Procurement and Sanctioning of Obstructive Practices (The World Bank, D.C.) Aug. 1, 2006.
187. John Hasnas, The Significant Meaninglessness of Arthur Andersen LLP v. United
States, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 187, 194 (2005).
188. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 14–15 (2002) (§ 1519 “is meant to apply broadly to
any acts to destroy or fabricate physical evidence so long as they are done with the intent to
obstruct, impede or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter, and
such matter is within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States”; is “specifically
meant not to include any technical requirement . . . to tie the obstructive conduct to a pending or imminent proceeding or matter”; and intends to “do away with the distinctions . . .
between court proceedings, investigations, regulatory or administrative proceedings (whether formal or not), and less formal government inquiries, regardless of their title”). Contemporaneous statements from legislators support the expansive understanding of § 1519. Upon
introducing the bill, Representative John Conyers, then-Chairman of the House Judiciary
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struction of § 1519 support a broad interpretation of the conduct prohibited
by the statute. Section 1519’s prohibition against “alter[ing], destroy[ing],
mutilat[ing], conceal[ing], cover[ing] up, falsif[ying], or mak[ing] a false
entry in” any document or tangible object apparently is expansive enough
to prohibit making false oral statements to company counsel conducting an
internal investigation, whose findings will ultimately be conveyed to U.S.
authorities.189
Speaking to the statute’s breadth, courts have interpreted § 1519 not to
require a direct nexus between an obstructive act and an ongoing government proceeding. This has empowered the U.S. government to use the
statute to prosecute obstructive conduct, for example, in the context of corporate internal investigations even when there was no government proceeding pending or even anticipated.190 Unlike the U.S. law interpreting § 1519,
Committee and a sponsor of SOX, said that § 1519 would create a new “felony which could
be effectively used in a wide array of cases where a person destroys or creates evidence with
the specific intent to obstruct a federal agency or a criminal investigation.” 148 CONG. REC.
E463–01, E463 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2002) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.). Senator Patrick Leahy—also a co-sponsor of the bill—declared on the Senate floor that “[t]here w[ill]
be no technical requirement that a judicial proceeding was already underway or that the
documents were formally under subpoena.” 148 CONG. REC. S1783–01, S1786 (daily ed.
Mar. 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
189. In United States v. Ray, the U.S. government charged senior executives of a public
company with conspiring to violate § 1519, by knowingly misleading the Chief Legal Officer in an internal investigation of potential stock-option backdating. Criminal Information,
United States v. Ray, No. 2:08-cr-01443 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2008). The Senior Vice President of Human Resources pleaded guilty to making false oral statements knowing that they
would be incorporated into a report on the company’s stock-option grant process (which
was submitted to the Audit Committee), “with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a
contemplated potential—but not actual or even imminent—SEC investigation of potential
back-dating practices. Plea Agreement for Defendant Gary Ray, United States v. Ray, No.
2:08-cr-01443 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2008).
190. For example, in April 2009, Hong “Rose” Carson was indicted, along with several
of her former co-workers at Control Components Inc. (“CCI”), a California-based control
valve manufacturer, for conspiring to pay bribes in violation of the FCPA. Carson was also
charged with destroying documents relevant to CCI’s internal investigation of the payments,
in violation of § 1519. Prosecutors claimed that just before her interview with the private
lawyers conducting the internal investigation, Carson tore up relevant documents and
flushed them down the toilet in a restroom at CCI. Although a federal investigation had not
been initiated, CCI had made a voluntary disclosure to the government two days before Carson destroyed the documents. See Indictment at 10, 28-29, United States v. Carson, SACR
No. 09-0077, (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2009) (demonstrating that CCI had made a voluntary disclosure); Richard L. Cassin, Rose Carson’s Big Flush, THE FCPA BLOG (Sept. 7, 2010, 7:28
AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/9/7/rose-carsons-big-flush.html
[https://perma.cc/4C4C-RE4N]. A superseding information was filed on April 16, 2012,
however, which eliminated the obstruction charge under § 1519. Superseding Information,
United States v. Carson, SACR No. 09-00077 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012). The government
stated in its motion, without further explanation, that “[i]n the interests of justice, the government seeks an order dismissing count sixteen [charging Carson with a violation of §
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however, the definition of Obstructive Practices does seem to require a
nexus between obstructive conduct and a Bank inquiry. Under the first
prong of the definition, the act must be done “deliberately . . . in order to
materially impede a Bank investigation”; and under the second prong of the
definition, the act must be “intended to materially impede the exercise of
the Bank’s inspection and audit rights.”191 Nevertheless, the logic behind
U.S. court decisions could apply to the actions of employees who mislead
internal investigators conducting a parallel inquiry into alleged Sanctionable Practices, knowing that the results of the investigation will be reported
to INT. Likewise, the definition of an Obstructive Practice seems to allow
for the possibility of even going back in time and considering as “obstructive” false statements or destructive acts in a tender process taken to hide
prohibited conduct from a future Bank inquiry.
3. Threats, Harassment, and Intimidation
Destroying, falsifying, and concealing documents are not the only
types of obstructive behavior that are sanctionable: “[T]hreatening, harassing or intimidating any party to prevent it from disclosing its knowledge of
matters relevant to the investigation” also count.192 To date, only one Sanctions Board decision has addressed such behavior, and it did so in the context of considering it as an aggravating factor. In Sanctions Board Decision
No. 47, INT primarily alleged that the respondent had submitted eighteen
forged or otherwise deceptive performance certificates to obtain Bankfunded contracts.193 INT argued that the respondent interfered in the
Bank’s investigation by “attempt[ing] to pressure the firms that purportedly
had issued the certificates . . . into recanting their conclusions of fraud.”194
In considering whether the behavior warranted aggravation, the Sanctions Board focused on the plain language of the Sanctioning Guidelines
describing conduct constituting “interference by the sanctioned party in the
1519] of the indictment.” In United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739 (11th Cir. 2008), a U.S.
appeals court upheld the conviction under § 1519 of a police detective who made a false incident report regarding the circumstances of an arrest, without knowing that the incident
would later be investigated by the FBI. The court found that it was sufficient for the purposes of the statute that the defendant was aware that the FBI had jurisdiction to investigate
claims. See also United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 714 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that it
is sufficient that the “matter” in connection with which the obstruction occurred “is within
the jurisdiction of a federal agency as a factual matter”).
191. Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits ¶ 1.14(v)(bb) (May
2004 rev. Oct. 2006) (emphasis added).
192. World Bank Procurement Guidelines § 1.16(a)(v)(aa) (Jan. 2011, rev. July 2014).
193. The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 47 (Sanctions
Case No. 121), ¶ 7 (2012).
194. Id. at ¶ 46 (2012).

1020

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 18:4

Bank’s investigation” as “threatening, harassing, or intimidating any party
to prevent it from disclosing its knowledge of matters relevant to the investigation.” 195 The Sanctions Board concluded that INT offered no evidence
that the respondent threatened, harassed, or intimidated anyone into recanting past assertions of fraud.196 Merely asking a firm to retract its statements, the Sanctions Board concluded, was insufficient to suggest a threat,
harassment, or intimidation, as is required by the aggravating factor.197
Although the Sanctions Board found insufficient evidence in this case,
firms subject to the Bank’s Guidelines should be wary of inducing someone
to withhold information from INT. This portion of the Obstructive Practice
definition is analogous to the U.S. criminal “witness and informant tampering” statute—18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)—and courts construing this statute historically will consider any circumstance that suggests a request to withhold
information was done in a subjectively or objectively threatening manner.
Section 1512(b) provides as follows:
Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly
persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to—
(1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person
in an official proceeding; [or]
(2) cause or induce any person to—
(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding; [or]
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with
intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for
use in an official proceeding;

....
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both.198

Judicial decisions interpreting § 1512(b) find that explicit threats of
physical harm to prevent a party from providing evidence clearly satisfy the
statute.199 But in the gray area between actual threats of physical force and,
like in Sanctions Board Decision No. 47, mere requests not to disclose in195. Id. at ¶ 46 (2012).
196. Id. at ¶ 47.
197. Id.
198. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b).
199. See United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that a witness,
who was the target of a murder investigation, violated 18 U.S.C. § 1512 when he met with
the murder victim’s family and attempted to persuade them not to speak candidly in any
government investigation, and implied victim’s family could be injured if they did not do as
instructed).
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formation, § 1512(b) case law suggests that even mere requests can be
threats if the requester knew that the recipient would feel threatened, given
the requester’s status or past behavior.200 It would be logical for the Sanctions Board to interpret an Obstructive Practice similarly. Indeed, Sanctions Board Decision No. 47 turned, in part, on the lack of any in-person
meeting between the respondent and the representatives he was alleged to
have threatened, and the lack of any other “evidence to suggest a threat,
harassment or intimidation beyond the request itself.”201 Had there been
evidence that the representatives actually felt threatened by the request, the
Sanctions Board may well have concluded that such behavior qualified as
an Obstructive Practice.
4. Concerns Raised by Obstructive Practices
Traditional requirements of due process are relaxed in administrative
proceedings, like the World Bank’s sanctions regime. Nevertheless, the
World Bank has acknowledged that those accused of violating its rules are
entitled to some measure of due process,202 and the sanctions regime as a
whole reflects some due-process considerations.203 The creation of obstruction as a Sanctionable Practice in 2006, however, gave rise to new due process concerns. In particular, it has created a possible problem within the
INT investigation process by shifting the balance of power in contractual
interpretation decisively to INT. The “contractual rights” referred to in the
Obstructive Practice definition include contractual provisions in Bankfunded contracts that typically allow the Bank to audit the “accounts and
records relating to the performance of the [World Bank contract].”204 As
discussed above, the scope of the Bank’s audit rights often is contested dur-

200. See United States v. Freeman, 208 F.3d 332 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that a mere
request to not talk to the police violated 18 U.S.C. § 1512 since a reasonable jury could infer
that the defendant knew the employee would be threatened by such words, given his status
as a police officer and her first-hand knowledge of his erratic personality and violent temper).
201. Sanctions Board Decision No. 47, ¶ 47 (2012).
202. See Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012 at 2-3
(“The Bank Group[‘s] . . . quasi-judicial administrative process for sanctioning firms . . . is
intended to provide the accused party . . . with an appropriate level of due process before it
is decided whether the Respondent will be sanctioned and, if so, which sanction will be imposed.”).
203. See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Edouard Fromageau, Balancing the
Scales: The World Bank Sanctions Process and Access to Remedies, 23 EUR. J. INT. LAW
963, 966 (2012) (discussing the due process considerations at play in the sanctions process).
204. The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 63, ¶ 103 (2014).
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ing the course of an INT audit,205 and there is uncertainty about whether a
respondent may attempt to hold INT to the strict confines of the Bank’s
contractual audit rights without committing an Obstructive Practice. With
this lack of certainty and no apparent mechanism by which to seek a neutral
decision, an entity facing a broad, potentially overreaching INT request
may have two unattractive options: (1) object to a request and face potential sanctions for obstruction or (2) comply with a request and risk potentially damning information being discovered. Importantly, such information could be unrelated to a Bank project and still put a firm in legal
jeopardy. As a matter of policy, the Bank shares information with national
authorities.206 Therefore, information could be discovered by INT during
an over-broad inspection that will, in turn, be handed over to national authorities that otherwise would lack probable cause. This highly plausible
scenario underscores the due process challenges this issue poses.
Other than relying on INT to work through these issues in good faith,
there currently is little opportunity for a party to object to a request or to
seek an impartial determination of whether the Bank is entitled to certain
information. In the U.S. law enforcement context, information obtained
where the government lacks probable cause might be excluded from evidence.207 In contrast, “[f]ormal rules of evidence shall not apply” in Sanctions Board proceedings.208 Rather, “[a]ny kind of evidence may form the
basis of arguments presented in a sanctions proceeding and conclusions
reached by the [SDO] or the Sanctions Board,” including hearsay evidence—and, potentially, improperly obtained evidence—with the SDO and
Sanctions Board having discretion “to determine the relevance, materiality,
weight, and sufficiency of all evidence offered.”209 One potential solution
would be for the SDO or Sanctions Board to accord no weight to improperly obtained evidence, so as not to reward investigative overreach. In a related situation, for example, Sanctions Board Decision Nos. 60 and 72 caution that “[t]he use of intimidation [by INT] is impermissible” and that
“[a]ny suggestion that an interviewee’s request to consult a lawyer in itself
demonstrates non-cooperation . . . may also raise concern as to the fairness
of the investigation.”210 Another possible solution would be to enable a pu205. See The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 63 (2014)
and Sanctions Board Decision No. 71 (2014) (detailing an instance of the Bank’s auditing
rights being contested).
206. See FY 15 Annual Update at 52-53 (providing information to national authorities).
207. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (providing for an exclusionary rule in evidence).
208. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. VII, §7.01 (Apr. 15, 2012); accord The
World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 59, ¶ 8 (2013).
209. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. VII, §7.01 (Apr. 15, 2012).
210. The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 72, (Sanctions
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tative respondent to contest the scope of an INT audit to the Sanctions
Board while it is ongoing, somewhat like a motion to suppress evidence211
or even a Bivens action in U.S. federal courts.212
A further due process tension arises from the fact that the Bank does
not require probable cause to exercise its audit right. Unlike a prosecuting
entity to whom the Bank very well could refer the investigation, INT can
leverage the provisions common to Bank-funded contracts at will to conduct invasive investigations. In addition, corporate deferred prosecution
agreements resolving FCPA charges routinely require companies to “cooperate fully with . . . the Multilateral Development Banks (‘MDBs’), in any
investigation of the Company.”213
B. Fraudulent Practice
Nearly 75% of Sanctions Board decisions involve allegations of a
Fraudulent Practice.214 Its definition and elements can vary depending upon which guidelines are incorporated in the bidding or procurement documents governing the project at issue. The January 1997 Consultant Guidelines, for instance, define a Fraudulent Practice as a “misrepresentation of
facts . . . in order to influence a selection process or the execution of a contract . . . to the detriment of the Borrower.”215 The May 2004 Procurement
Guidelines, by contrast, do not mention detriment to the borrower and define a Fraudulent Practice to include, in addition to misrepresentations, any
“omission of facts in order to influence a procurement process or the execution of a contract.”216 The World Bank’s Legal Vice Presidency has since
opined that pre-2004 definitions of a Fraudulent Practice were never intended to exclude omissions; rather, the 2004 definition clarified “existing
understandings of the sanctionable practice, not expansions of their
scope.”217
Case No. 211), ¶ 34 (2014) (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 60 (2013)).
211. In U.S. federal courts and some state courts, criminal defendants can conditionally
plead guilty while reserving the right to challenge the admissibility of certain inculpatory
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Goyer, 567 F. Appx. 414 (6th Cir. 2014) (providing an
example of conditional pleadings).
212. A Bivens action is initiated when a person sues federal officers for violating his or
her constitutional rights.
213. Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 5, United States v. Weatherford Int’l Ltd. (S.D.
Tex. Nov. 26, 2013).
214. Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 22.
215. The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 53, ¶ 29 (2012).
216. The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 46, ¶ 11 (2012).
217. Anne-Marie Leroy, Advisory Opinion on Certain Issues Arising in Connection with
Recent Sanctions Cases, Opinion No. 2010/1, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY UNIT OF THE WORLD
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In October 2006, the World Bank added an explicit mens rea requirement, defining a Fraudulent Practice as “any act or omission, including a
misrepresentation, that knowingly or recklessly misleads, or attempts to
mislead, a party to obtain a financial or other benefit or to avoid an obligation.”218 The Sanctions Board has read “knowingly or recklessly” into preOctober 2006 definitions, concluding that the “October 2006 incorporation
of the ‘knowing or reckless’ standard was intended only to make explicit
the pre-existing standard for mens rea, not to articulate a new limitation.”219
The Bank again updated the Procurement and Consultant Guidelines in July 2014, but did not alter the definition of Fraudulent Practice. 220
The required objective or purpose of the misrepresentations or omissions also can vary depending upon which definition applies. The October
2006 Procurement Guidelines require a misrepresentation or omission be
made in order to “obtain a financial or other benefit or to avoid an obligation,” whereas the May 2004 Procurement Guidelines look to whether a
misrepresentation was intended to “influence” the selection or execution of
a contract.221 The October 2006 definition appears to expand the range of
conduct that could qualify as fraudulent, as the subject conduct is no longer
tethered to that which is intended to influence the selection of execution of
a contract. In Sanctions Board Decision No. 74, the respondent was subject
to both definitions because of its involvement in one project in Ethiopia,
which was governed by the May 2004 Procurement Guidelines, and two
others in Tanzania and Uganda, both of which were governed by the October 2006 Procurement Guidelines.222 Combining the definitions, the Sanctions Board noted that a Fraudulent Practice required INT to show “(i)[]
misrepresentations or omissions of facts (ii) that were knowing or reckless
(iii) in order to influence the procurement process or the execution of a
contract (May 2004 Procurement Guidelines), or in order to obtain a financial or other benefit or avoid an obligation (October 2006 Procurement

BANK, ¶ 124 (Nov. 15, 2010).
218. Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits ¶ 1.14(a)(ii) (May
2004 rev. Oct. 2006) (emphasis added).
219. Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, ¶ 14 (2015); Sanctions Board Decision No. 71, ¶
12 (2014).
220. Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants under IBRD Loans and IDA
Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers (The World Bank, D.C.) Jan. 2011 rev. July
2014; Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services Under
IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers (The World Bank, D.C.)
Jan. 2011 rev. July 2014.
221. Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits ¶ 1.14(a)(ii) (May
2004); Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits ¶ 1.14(a)(ii) (May
2004 rev. Oct. 1, 2006).
222. The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 74, ¶ 25 (2014).

2016]

SANCTIONABLE PRACTICES AT THE WORLD BANK

1025

Guidelines).”223 The Sanctions Board ultimately ruled in INT’s favor, concluding that the misrepresentation related to the Ethiopia project “was intended to ‘influence a procurement process’” and the misrepresentations
related to the projects in Uganda and Tanzania “were made to ‘obtain a financial or other benefit.’”224
1. Omission or Misrepresentation
The Bank’s Guidelines do not define what constitutes a “misrepresentation” or “omission.” Typical misrepresentations considered in Sanctions
Board decisions involve false bid information (e.g., fabricated performance
certificates or forged signatures) or false documents used during contract
execution (e.g., bogus invoices for reimbursement).225 In addition to affirmative misrepresentations, the Sanctions Board has also found that a respondent’s failure to disclose a conflict of interest constituted a misrepresentation or omission of facts.226
In determining whether a misrepresentation has occurred, the Sanctions Board has relied on a variety of evidence.227 In several decisions, the
Sanctions Board has found sufficient evidence of misrepresentations based
primarily on admissions contained in responses to show-cause letters or at
Sanctions Board hearings.228 The Sanctions Board also has considered
statements from INT interviews to varying degrees. Standardized state223. Id.
224. Sanctions Board Decision No. 74 ¶ 29 (2014).
225. See World Bank Group, Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty, SANCTIONS BOARD L. DIGEST, at 25-32 (Dec. 2011) (providing case summaries). Other examples of misrepresentation include forged advance payment guarantees,
id. at 25; forged bid securities, id. at 25; falsified curriculum vitae, id. at 27; audit report of
another entity in place of its own, id. at 28; forged financial report, id. at 28; forged manufacturer authorizations, id. at 30; and statements regarding the progress of contract execution, id. at 31.
226. Sanctions Board Decision No. 65 (2014). The request for proposal at issue in
Sanctions Board Decision No. 65 required bidders to disclose any existing conflicts of interest. The Sanctions Board relied on the definition of “conflict of interest” found in the May
2004 Consultant Guidelines. Because a conflict of interest existed and the Respondent did
not disclose it, the Sanctions Board found that the Respondent’s proposal contained a misrepresentation or omission of facts. Id. ¶ 49; see also Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, ¶
50 (Sept. 30, 2015) (stating that failure to disclose an agency relationship as required constituted a misrepresentation).
227. See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 46 ¶ 23 (2012) (representing one example);
The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 48 ¶ 23 (2012).
228. See Sanctions Board Decision No. 48 ¶ 23 & n.7 (2012) (citing Sanctions Board
Decision No. 2, ¶ 4 (2008) and Sanctions Board Decision No. 6, ¶ 6 (2009)); Sanctions
Board Decision No. 52, ¶ 21 (2012); Sanctions Board Decision No. 53, ¶ 31 (2012); The
World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 75, ¶ 20 & n.8 (2014).
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ments on pre-printed Bank letterhead have been found less compelling than
personal attestations in the witness’s own words.229 Moreover, summaries
prepared by INT, especially those which lack the interviewee’s signature or
contain an alleged admission of misconduct, carry less weight than verbatim transcripts.230
In Sanctions Board Decision No. 59, one of only two publicly available decisions in which the Sanctions Board found insufficient evidence of a
misrepresentation, the respondent submitted a bid to construct an underwater sewage outfall in Colombia.231 The bidding documents required each
bidder to provide information about its experience as a principal contractor
of similar projects.232 The respondent provided a list of previous projects
and submitted a performance certificate purportedly signed by a representative involved in one of those projects.233 INT alleged that the certificate
contained false statements and a false signature, pointing to a seemingly
large amount of evidence, including facial inconsistencies on the certificate, the purported signatory’s denial of having signed the certificate, and
other testimonial evidence that the respondent was not in fact the principal
contractor for the listed project.234 Although the purported signatory’s denial was transcribed by INT, the Sanctions Board noted several concerns
that undermined its weight: the purported signatory refused to provide a
sample signature for comparison; would not reaffirm in a signed, written
statement his testimony to INT; and refused to answer repeated questions
regarding whether he would normally sign such documents.235
The Sanctions Board also considered whether there was evidence of
misrepresentations on the face of the bid. Here, too, the evidence was lacking.236 Without appropriate comparators, the Sanctions Board rejected supposed discrepancies in the certificate’s letterhead, font, and form.237 The
Sanctions Board also rejected INT’s contention that the certificate falsely
described the respondent as “the main contractor” for a listed project when,
229. Sanctions Board Decision No. 47, ¶ 24 (2012).
230. Id.; see also Sanctions Board Decision No. 64, ¶¶ 33–34 (2014) (finding that the
INT’s record of its interview with the Respondent should be given limited weight because
the record was not created with adequate notice of the legal repercussions of the Respondent’s statements).
231. Sanctions Board Decision No. 59 ¶¶ 5-7 (2013); The World Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 73, (2014), discussed below, is the other publicly available decision in which the Sanctions Board found insufficient evidence of a misrepresentation as to
one of the respondents.
232. Sanctions Board Decision No. 59, ¶ 6 (2013).
233. Id. ¶ 7.
234. Id. ¶ 12.
235. Id. ¶¶ 21-22.
236. Id. ¶ 24.
237. Id. ¶ 24.
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in fact, the certificate referred to the respondent’s role as “a Main Contractor.”238 In doing so, the Sanctions Board noted that INT relied on stale witness testimony characterizing the work the respondent actually performed
as opposed to, for example, contemporaneous documents demonstrating the
respondent’s actual role in the listed projects.239 The Sanctions Board
therefore terminated the proceedings and lifted the temporary suspension
that had been imposed by the SDO.240
The Sanctions Board has addressed the concept of a culpable act or
omission consistently with its flexible approach to consider all forms of
probative evidence. Where testimony has been incomplete or incredible,
the Sanctions Board has considered “whether the record as a whole may
contain sufficient additional evidence to corroborate or complement the
witness’s statements.”241 But as these decisions show, this does not mean
that the Sanctions Board necessarily accepts any kind of evidence without
scrutiny.
2. Knowingly or Recklessly
There often is little debate about whether, as a factual matter, a misrepresentation or omission occurred. The more common focus is whether
the misrepresentation or omission was done knowingly or recklessly.242
Nevertheless, the Sanctions Board has yet to find in a publicly available
decision that a misrepresentation occurred without knowledge or recklessness. The Anti-Corruption Guidelines include an explanatory footnote
providing that “[t]o act ‘knowingly or recklessly’, the fraudulent actor must
either know that the information or impression being conveyed is false, or
be recklessly indifferent as to whether it is true or false.”243 The Sanctions
Procedures allow the Sanctions Board to infer knowledge from circumstantial evidence.244 As the Legal Vice Presidency has explained, this flexible
approach, consistent with the administrative nature of Sanctions Board pro238. Id. ¶¶ 26-27.
239. Id. ¶ 27.
240. Id. ¶ 30.
241. Id. ¶ 24.
242. See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, ¶ 51 (2015) (using the “knowingly”
standard to find that the First Predecessor Firm failed to disclose its relationship with the
Marketing Consultant); Sanctions Board Decision No. 52, ¶ 23 (2012) (summarizing the
parties’ arguments for and against the Respondent possessing the requisite knowledge and
recklessness to establish a misrepresentation of facts).
243. World Bank Anti-Corruption Guidelines, at 3 n.13 (Oct. 15, 2006 rev. Jan. 2011).
244. World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. VII, § 7.01 (Apr. 15, 2012) (noting that the
“Evaluation Officer and the Sanctions Board shall have the discretion to infer purpose, intent and/or knowledge on the part of the Respondent, or any other party, from circumstantial
evidence”).
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ceedings, is designed to avoid unreasonable evidentiary burdens of proving
scienter.245
Sanctions Board decisions frequently give brief attention to the issue
of knowledge, as this concept is self-explanatory and may be substantiated
through the respondent’s own contemporaneous statements or admissions
made during sanctions proceedings.246 In “indirect fraud” cases, however,
where the respondent relies on or conveys information supplied by a third
party (for example, when a primary contractor submits a bid that contains
false information from a subcontractor), establishing the mens rea required
for a Fraudulent Practice is more complex. Here, the Sanctions Board has
turned to the lesser standard of recklessness, which requires INT to show
that the “respondent was aware of, but disregarded, a substantial risk – such
as harm to the integrity of the Bank’s procurement process due to false or
misleading bid documents.”247 Alternatively, if evidence fails to show subjective awareness of a risk, the Sanctions Board looks to whether the respondent “should have known of the substantial risk presented” by applying a “due care” standard—i.e., whether the respondent exercised “the
degree of care the proverbial ‘reasonable person’ would exercise under the
circumstances”—as informed by industry standards, customary or firmspecific business policies, the World Bank’s procurement policies, and the
underlying bidding documents.248 As discussed below, this approach veers
from the commonly understood definition of recklessness under AngloAmerican jurisprudence and is more akin to simple negligence.249
245. Anne-Marie Leroy, supra note 217, at ¶¶ 101, 104.
246. See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 46, ¶ 24 (2012) (stating that the record included an admission that the individual who forged a signature admitted that “he was not
authorized” to sign the documents); Sanctions Board Decision No. 48, ¶ 24 (2012) (holding
that a deliberate attempt to mislead is sufficient to establish fraudulent practices and that a
showing of actually being misled is unnecessary). See also Sanctions Board Decision No.
83, ¶ 51 (2015) (finding that a failure to disclose an agency agreement was done knowingly); Sanctions Board Decision No. 75, ¶¶ 21–24 (Nov. 6, 2014) (finding that an inauthentic
manufacturer’s authorization was submitted knowingly, based on inconsistent and incredible
explanations); Sanctions Board Decision No. 74, ¶ 28 (2014) (relying on an admission to
establish knowledge); Sanctions Board Decision No. 72, ¶ 40 (2014) (same).
247. The World Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 51 (Sanctions Case No.
145& 146), ¶ 33 (2012); Sanctions Board Decision No. 52, ¶ 25 (2012); accord The World
Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 82 (Sanctions Case No. 335), ¶ 31
(2015) (stating that when circumstantial evidence indicates that one should have been aware
of a substantial risk, the due care standard of a reasonable person applies).
248. Sanctions Board Decision No. 82, supra note 247, ¶ 31; Sanctions Board Decision
No. 51, ¶ 33 (2012).
249. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2007) (“While the
term recklessness is not self-defining, the common law has generally understood it in the
sphere of civil liability as conduct violating an objective standard: action entailing an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.” (inter-
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It also differs from the analysis of the Legal Vice Presidency. In an
advisory opinion from 2010, the Legal Vice Presidency clarified the standard for recklessness, among other legal issues.250 According to the Legal
Vice Presidency, due care “asks what precautions a reasonable person
would take — in the case of fraud, what steps a bidder should take to ascertain the accuracy of information contained in the bid — in light of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that at least some of that information may be
false or misleading.”251 The Legal Vice Presidency recommended that the
degree of due care should correspond to the (1) likelihood that false information is being conveyed and (2) potential severity of harm flowing therefrom.252 If either factor increases or decreases, so too does the standard of
due care.253 The severity of harm, according to the Legal Vice Presidency,
can be measured in terms of internal impact on the integrity of the procurement process (i.e., to what extent is the information material to the
overall bid), as well as collateral consequences (i.e., whether falsification
potentially threatens life or severely impacts the economy).254
A
cost/benefit analysis was also recommended: “There may be cases where a
particular risk is justifiable in light of the potential benefits to be
gained . . . .”255 Likewise, “taking a particular risk may be justifiable in
light of the exorbitant cost of guarding against it.”256
The standard of due care serves as a baseline against which to judge
the respondent’s conduct.257 According to the Legal Vice Presidency,
“recklessness requires a deviation [from due care] more egregious than either simple and even ‘ordinary’ gross negligence.”258 In other words, “[i]t
is not enough to show merely that the reasonable person would have acted
differently in light of the risks involved, but [it must be shown] that the Respondent’s conduct represents a shocking indifference to those risks.”259
Although the Legal Vice Presidency’s advisory opinion does not offer
specific examples showing the degree of deviation from the common due
care standard that would give rise to a Fraudulent Practice, it does provide
that merely signing or including false or misleading information in bid ma-

nal quotation marks omitted)).
250. Anne-Marie Leroy, supra note 217, at ¶ 1.
251. Id. ¶ 106.
252. Id. ¶ 113.
253. Id. ¶ 107.
254. Id. ¶ 107.
255. Id. ¶ 108.
256. Id. ¶ 108.
257. Id. ¶ 106.
258. Id. ¶ 102.
259. Id. ¶ 113.
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terials would not, by itself, suffice.260 This is consistent with the AntiCorruption Guidelines, which state that inaccurate information caused by
“simple negligence” does not constitute recklessness.261
To be clear, the Legal Vice Presidency offers its standard for due care
only as a recommendation. And it acknowledges that the standard ideally
would be derived from the Bank’s procurement policies and the bidding
documents governing the Bank-funded project.262 It also acknowledges,
however, that the Bank’s policies do not provide a specific standard of care
for preparing bids.263 Consequently, it recommends “alternative approaches to the development of a Bank-specific concept of an appropriate reasonable standard of care in the context of Bank operations.”264
Its first alternative approach is to examine the bidding documents to
see if they specify a standard of care.265 Its second alternative approach is
to consider relevant industry standards and customary or firm-specific
business policies, procedures, or practices.266 Finally, the Legal Vice Presidency proposes that, when the first two approaches do not provide guidance, “standards be articulated over time through jurisprudence.”267 The
Legal Vice Presidency describes this third approach as “a kind of ‘common
law’ approach to the development of Bank law in this area,”268 which requires the SDO and Sanctions Board to “exercise discretion in deciding
such cases based on the individual facts of each case.”269
Although the Bank has repeatedly stated that negligence is not enough
to meet the mens rea required for a Fraudulent Practice, the Sanctions
Board’s standard is similar to negligence—i.e., the failure to abide by the
standards of a reasonable person under the same circumstances—rather
than explicitly requiring the kind of “shocking” deviation from the standard
of care suggested by the Legal Vice Presidency. For example, in Sanctions
260. Id. ¶ 115.
261. World Bank Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 243, at ¶ 7 n.10.
262. Anne-Marie Leroy, supra note 217, at ¶ 111.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. The Sanctions Board recognizes stare decisis; it routinely cites the precedents
set by its prior decisions. See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, ¶ 53 (2015) (“[T]he
Sanctions Board will consider, consistent with past precedent, whether the First Predecessor
Firm (i) had an actual or potential conflict of interest, (ii) that was subject to a disclosure
obligation, and (iii) disclosed any such conflict of interest.”); Sanctions Board Decision No.
81, ¶ 29 (2015) (Sanctions Board pronouncing that its interpretation of the May 2004 Consultant Guidelines “would be consistent with the Sanctions Board’s precedent and the sanctions framework”).
269. Anne-Marie Leroy, supra note 217, at ¶ 111.
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Board Decision No. 82, INT alleged that the respondent, an accounting
firm, recklessly appended inaccurate data sheets to audits report that it was
selected to provide in connection with a Bank-funded project.270 The respondent countered, among other things, that the information was preliminary and that local staff assigned to the audited project may have contributed to the alleged inaccuracies.271 The Sanctions Board determined that the
respondent was on notice of a substantial risk of inaccuracies because of
various difficulties in obtaining information, including the fact that some of
the information could not have been verified until after the audit reports
were submitted.272 The Sanctions Board applied a standard of care informed by the terms of the relevant contracts.273 Because the information
included on the data sheets appeared to be critical to the contracts, and because “the record d[id] not reflect that the Respondent took adequate steps
to verify the statements and key findings” before submission, the Sanctions
Board found that the respondent’s failure to confirm or correct the data
sheets was reckless.274 Thus, although the facts presented may have actually suggested reckless conduct, the due care standard employed by the Sanctions Board appeared more akin to negligence.
Further, in Sanctions Board Decision No. 79, INT alleged that the respondent acted knowingly or recklessly in submitting bids that contained a
falsified work experience certificate.275 The respondent admitted that the
certificate was falsified, but attributed the misconduct to a rogue employee
project manager.276 The Sanctions Board concluded that the record did not
support a finding that the respondent acted knowingly, but considered
whether the respondent acted recklessly in submitting the false certificate.277 INT argued that the respondent must have been aware of the risk
that the work experience certificate was false because it contained four
“major discrepancies,” including identifying incorrectly the name, number,
and value of the cited contract.278 In determining whether the respondent
should have been aware of a substantial risk that the document was false,
the Sanctions Board considered “whether any indicia of falsity were apparent on the face of the document and whether a responsible individual made
any effort to supervise the bid preparation process,” as well as “whether the
record shows that the respondent took precautions that were commensurate
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Sanctions Board Decision No. 82 (Sanctions Case No. 335), ¶¶ 7, 8, 15 (2015).
Id. ¶¶ 16, 21.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 33.
Id. ¶¶ 33-34.
The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 79, ¶ 6 (2015).
Id. at ¶ 12 (2015).
Id. at ¶¶ 24-25 (2015).
Id. at ¶ 25 (2015).
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with the risk involved.”279 The Sanctions Board determined that the respondent’s employees should have been aware of a substantial risk that the
certificate was false, because “basic discrepancies” on the document
“should have been apparent . . . at the time of the Bids’ preparation.”280 In
addition, the Sanctions Board faulted the employees who signed the bids
for not examining the certificate for authenticity.281 Because of the reasonable-person, due-care standard employed by the Board, it is difficult to
gauge whether the respondent’s conduct actually constituted shocking indifference to a substantial risk rather than, for example, simple or even
gross negligence.282
3. Analogues Under U.S. Law
One established area of law in which the Sanctions Board can benefit
from close examination as it further develops the Bank’s jurisprudence is
the U.S. common law of fraud. Such an approach may help to root the
Sanctions Board’s jurisprudence more firmly in traditional concepts of
recklessness, as suggested by the Legal Vice Presidency. The common law
elements of civil fraud in the United States can differ by state, but in most
jurisdictions one of the elements is the “defendant’s knowledge that the
statement was false.”283 Some states do not require direct knowledge but
instead require a showing of recklessness.
Those U.S. states that require recklessness, however, seem to interpret
the standard as requiring further deviation from the standard of care than
that employed by the Sanctions Board. For example, both New York and
Texas “permit a showing of scienter by recklessness only when the plaintiff
alleges facts showing that the speaker made a statement as a definitive assertion knowing he was without knowledge as to the truth.”284 In contrast,
as discussed above, the Sanctions Board has found recklessness where the
respondent “should have known” that a document “could be” forged.285
The Legal Vice Presidency’s 2010 advisory opinion explored U.S.
laws for which “recklessness” and “knowledge” have been applied as an

279. Id. at ¶ 27 (2015).
280. Id. at ¶ 28 (2015).
281. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29 (2015).
282. See also Sanctions Board Decision No. 77, ¶ 33 (2015) (applying the common “due
care” standard).
283. Tricontinental Indus. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 841 (7th Cir.
2007) (citing Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482 (Ill. 1996)).
284. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litig.), 761
F. Supp. 2d 504, 536 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (emphasis added).
285. Sanctions Board Decision No. 52, ¶ 24 (2012).
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element of fraud.286 In particular, the Legal Vice Presidency considered
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act, the books-and-records provision of the FCPA, and the False Claims Act. Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act does not specify a mens rea, but courts have interpreted it to
include a “knowing or reckless” standard.287 Courts construing Rule 10b-5
have defined “reckless conduct” as “a highly unreasonable [act or] omission, involving . . . an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary
care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been
aware of it.”288 Likewise, under the books-and-records provision of the
FCPA, issuers may be held criminally liable for knowingly falsifying
books, records, or accounts.289 Similarly, the False Claims Act holds parties liable for knowingly presenting a false claim for payment to the U.S.
government, where “knowingly” includes “deliberate ignorance of the truth
or falsity of the information” or “acts in reckless disregard of the truth or
falsity of the information.”290 As the Legal Vice Presidency noted in its
2010 advisory opinion, U.S. courts have interpreted this language to include “failures to explore a credible concern about billing or other records,
‘seriously deficient’ record-keeping systems or failures to inquire that rise
to the level of ‘deliberate ignorance.’”291 Reference to these developed areas of law that address the concept of recklessness could aid the Sanctions
Board in sharpening its jurisprudence.

286. Anne-Marie Leroy, Advisory Opinion on Certain Issues Arising in Connection with
Recent Sanctions Cases, Opinion No. 2010/1, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY UNIT OF THE WORLD
BANK, ¶ 99 (Nov. 15, 2010).
287. Id. at ¶ 99 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1976)).
288. Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis
added); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added and internal citation omitted).
289. United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2009). The Legal Vice Presidency’s advisory opinion does not appear to have considered civil liability under the
FCPA’s books-and-records provision, which requires issuers to keep books and records with
“such level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.” 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7). The U.S. Congress legislated that an organization must act with specific intent to be held criminally liable. Most courts have construed the accounting provisions to have no scienter requirement when enforced civilly
against issuers. F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Elizabeth Goergen Silver, The U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Enforcement and Compliance, at A-23, 285 SECURITIES
PRACTICE PORTFOLIO SERIES (BNA) (2014).
290. 31 U.S.C § 3729 (b)(1)(A)(ii), (iii).
291. Anne-Marie Leroy, Advisory Opinion on Certain Issues Arising in Connection with
Recent Sanctions Cases, Opinion No. 2010/1, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY UNIT OF THE WORLD
BANK, ¶ 99 (Nov. 15, 2010). (citing Miller v. United States, 550 F.2d 17, 23 (Ct. Cl. 1997)
and United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
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4. To Obtain a Financial or Other Benefit or Avoid an Obligation
The January 2011 Procurement Guidelines (as revised in July 2014)
require the misrepresentation to be motivated by financial gain, some other
benefit, or avoidance of an obligation.292 Under the earlier definitions of a
Fraudulent Practice, INT need only show that the misrepresentation occurred in order to influence the procurement process or execution of a contract.293 Whichever standard applies, the threshold to establish this element
is quite low. If the Sanctions Board concludes it is more likely than not
that a knowing or reckless misrepresentation occurred, the act of submitting
the falsification—whether for a tender or during contract execution—
generally suffices to establish a motive either to obtain a financial gain or
to influence the procurement process or execution of a contract. As the
Sanctions Board stated in Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, the Board has
“found sufficient evidence of intent to influence the procurement process
where the record showed that misrepresentations had been made in response to a tender requirement” and has found “evidence of intent to influence the execution of a contract where a misrepresentation was material to
a respondent’s remuneration.”294 For example, the Sanctions Board has
found that the submission of a forged certificate was aimed to influence the
procurement process because the tender required such a certificate and the
respondent likely submitted the forged certificate to win the bid.295 Similarly, in a case where a general manager signed and submitted a letter of
commitment under a consultant’s name without permission, the Sanctions
Board inferred motive to influence the bidding process because the request
for proposal required the certificate and because the tendering entity “made
clear in negotiations it saw the Consultant’s particular involvement as im-

292. Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services under
IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers ¶ 1.16(a)(ii) (Jan. 2011
rev. July 2014).
293. See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 101 (2013) (finding all elements of
fraud because it was more likely than not misrepresentation occurred to influence the procurement process and/or to obtain a financial benefit); Sanctions Board Decision No. 53, ¶
35 (2012) (finding misrepresentations in the invoices and supporting documentation were
made in order to influence the execution of a contract).
294. Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, ¶¶ 52, 63 & nn.10, 13 (2015) (citing Sanctions
Board Decision No. 74, ¶ 29 (2014) and Sanctions Board Decision No. 56, ¶ 47 (2013)).
295. The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 54, ¶ 28 (2012);
see also Sanctions Board Decision No. 75, ¶ 25 (2014) (“The Sanctions Board has previously found that, where the record showed that a respondent’s submission of forged or misleading documents was made in response to a bid requirement, the respondent’s use of the documents was more likely than not intended to show the respondent’s qualifications and
thereby help the respondent win the tender and benefit from such award.”).
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portant.”296 In contrast, in Sanctions Board Decision No. 81, the Sanctions
Board concluded, over a dissent, that meeting minutes that incorrectly represented a proposed team leader’s availability for the contract at issue were
not intended to influence the selection process in light of evidence that the
respondent had previously communicated the team leader’s unavailability
to the implementing agency.297
With respect to motive of financial gain, which was first set forth in
the 2006 Procurement Guidelines, trying to obtain a contract appears to be
considered synonymous with seeking to obtain a financial benefit.298 In
fact, the Sanctions Board has rejected arguments that the respondent did
not need to win a tender and therefore was not motivated by financial gain,
observing that “[e]ven if Respondent had other business priorities, it must
have stood to obtain some benefit from being awarded the Tender; otherwise it would not have authorized the bid in the first place.”299 Notably,
nowhere in the publicly available Sanctions Board misrepresentation decisions has the Sanctions Board ever concluded that motive of financial gain
did not exist where there was an attempt to influence the procurement process or contract execution. For all practical purposes, a knowing or reckless submission of a misrepresentation in the course of a Bank-funded project appears to satisfy this element.
5. Detriment to the Borrower
Some definitions of a Fraudulent Practice require detriment to the borrower. The Sanctions Board defines “detriment to the Borrower” broadly
to include “not only tangible or quantifiable harms, but also intangible
harms.”300 Again, the threshold here is quite low. “Detriment to the borrower” generally is established so long as the misrepresentation could conceivably harm the borrower, even if the respondent ultimately completed
the contract as specified. This is because the Sanctions Board regards a
fraudulent submission as inherently detrimental; misrepresentations distort
the selection process, undermine a fair and efficient procurement process,
and waste the borrower’s time and resources on reviewing invalid bids.301
296. Sanctions Board Decision No. 51, ¶ 40 (2012).
297. Sanctions Board Decision No. 81, ¶ 43 (2015).
298. See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 101 (2013) (listing a contract award
as an example of a financial benefit); Sanctions Board Decision No. 48, ¶ 26 (2012) (finding
the respondent had submitted fraudulent documents to be awarded the tender and obtain
some financial benefit as a result).
299. Sanctions Board Decision No. 48, ¶ 26 (2012).
300. Sanctions Board Decision No. 47, ¶ 29 (2012).
301. Id. (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 41 (2010)); see also Sanctions Board Decision No. 73, ¶ 34 (2014) (“Detriment to a borrowing country may include intangible as
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In cases where the misrepresentation led to obtaining a Bank-financed contract, inherent harm results simply by contracting with “a bidder willing to
engage in unethical behavior.”302 No publicly available Sanctions Board
decision has found that a knowing or reckless misrepresentation failed to
cause (even intangible) harm to the borrower. Again, it appears from the
decisions issued to date that knowing or reckless misrepresentations are
considered to be inherently prejudicial. Perhaps because it was rendered
redundant, this element was removed from the Guidelines in 2004 and has
not reappeared in subsequent versions.
6. Respondeat Superior
The Sanctions Board sometimes must determine whether an employer
is liable for the fraudulent acts of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior. In these instances, the Sanctions Board considers
“whether the employees acted within the course and scope of their employment, and were motivated, at least in part, by the intent of serving their
employer.”303 Where a respondent company argues that the misconduct
was the result of a “rogue employee,” the Sanctions Board will assess “evidence presented regarding the scope and adequacy of the respondent entity’s controls and supervision at the time of the misconduct.”304 The Sanctions Board has declined to require proof that an entity expressly condoned
or directed the misconduct in question, and has instead asked “whether the
employee’s misrepresentations were . . . ‘a mode, albeit an improper mode’
of carrying out his duties.”305
For example, in Sanctions Board Decision No. 48, the deputy general
manager of the respondent’s branch office forged a bid document.306 As a
defense, the respondent argued that the deputy general manager engaged in
the misconduct without its consent, authorization, or knowledge.307 The
Sanctions Board, however, did not endorse this “rogue employee” theory,
well as tangible or quantifiable harms . . . .”); Sanctions Board Decision No. 69, ¶ 24 (2014)
(same).
302. Sanctions Board Decision No. 47, ¶ 29 (2012) (citing Sanctions Board Decision
No. 41 (2010)).
303. Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, ¶ 69 (2015); Sanctions Board Decision No. 73, ¶
35 (2014).
304. Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, ¶ 69 (2015); see also Sanctions Board Decision
No. 48, ¶ 28 (2012) (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 37, ¶ 42 (2010)) (finding an employer’s failure to implement any controls enough to hold it responsible for the actions of its
employees and finding no evidence of any defenses such as a “rogue employee”).
305. Sanctions Board Decision No. 48, ¶ 29 (2012).
306. Id. at ¶ 8 (2012).
307. Id. at ¶ 16(ii) (2012).
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holding the respondent liable because it did not have controls in place to
prevent or detect the type of misconduct that occurred, nor did it adequately
supervise the employee,308 despite what the Sanctions Board viewed as his
“relative inexperience and the challenges of the operating environment in
which Respondent placed him.”309 Responsibility for preparing the bidding
documents was left entirely to the branch office, which had no arrangements to verify their accuracy.310 Additionally, the Sanctions Board viewed
as probative the respondent’s incentive structure, in which employees received bonuses based on the contracts they brought in.311 The Sanctions
Board found that the incentive structure was not necessarily inappropriate,
“but [that] it demands strong controls to ensure unethical conduct does not
result.”312
In contrast, in Sanctions Board Decision No. 73, the Sanctions Board
found that the respondent firm was not responsible for the respondent director’s fraudulent conduct. In particular, the evidence failed to show that
the director was acting on behalf of the firm as a duly authorized officer
and employee.313
In sum, though the definition of a Fraudulent Practice varies somewhat depending on which Guidelines apply, it generally requires a respondent knowingly or recklessly mislead, or attempt to mislead, a party
for the purpose of obtaining a benefit or avoiding an obligation. A Fraudulent Practice is the most common charge brought before the Sanctions
Board and can be proven in a variety of ways. In most Fraudulent Practice
cases, proving knowledge or recklessness has been relatively straightforward. For “indirect fraud” cases where information is conveyed by third
parties, the Sanctions Board considers recklessness using a “due care”
standard akin to negligence. Similar to showing fraud under U.S. civil law,
the Legal Vice Presidency has recommended that recklessness require more
than a simple deviation from the standard of due care. But in practice, the
Sanctions Board has applied a standard that hews more closely to negligence. Finally, the Sanctions Board has applied basic principles of respondeat superior to determine whether an employer is liable for the fraudulent acts of its employees.

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id. at ¶ 30 (2012).
Id. at ¶ 30 (2012).
Id. at ¶ 30 (2012).
Id. at ¶ 31 (2012).
Id. at ¶ 31 (2012).
Sanctions Board Decision No. 73, ¶ 36 (2014).
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C. Corrupt Practice
Corruption in connection with a Bank-financed project can also lead
to sanctions. Earlier World Bank Guidelines defined a Corrupt Practice as
“the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of anything of value to influence the action of a public official in the [procurement or selection] process
or in contract execution.”314 That definition survived several revisions before being subtly expanded in May 2004 to encompass “the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, directly or indirectly, of anything of value to
influence the action of a public official in the [procurement or selection]
process or in contract execution.”315
Another change resulted from October 2006 amendments that redefined a Corrupt Practice as “the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or indirectly, of anything of value to influence improperly the actions
of another party.”316 The Guidelines have undergone several subsequent
revisions—the Procurement Guidelines most recently in July 2014—but
this definition remains operative.317 Two footnotes in the Guidelines elucidate the added text. The first states that “any action to influence the [procurement or selection] process or contract execution for undue advantage is
improper.”318 And the second defines “another party” as “a public official
acting in relation to the [procurement or selection] process or contract execution.”319 This clarification seemingly cuts against the interpretation that
“another party” was substituted for “public official” in October 2006 to
give the definition a broader scope.
Typical corruption cases reviewed by the Sanctions Board involve allegations of payments to procurement officials in exchange for confidential
314. Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 52. This definition
applied to any cases brought under the January 1995 version of the Procurement Guidelines
(rev. Jan. and Aug. 1996, Sept. 1997, and Jan. 1999) or the January 1997 version of the
Consultant Guidelines (rev. Sept. 1997, Jan. 1999, and May 2002). Id.
315. Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits ¶ 1.14(a)(i) (May
2004) (emphasis added); Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World
Bank Borrowers ¶ 1.22(a)(i) (May 2004) (emphasis added). This definition applies to cases
brought under the May 2004 versions of the Procurement or Consultant Guidelines. Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty, SANCTIONS BOARD
LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 52.
316. Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits ¶ 1.14(a)(i) (May
2004 rev. Oct. 2006) (emphasis added); Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers ¶ 1.22(a)(i) (May 2004 rev. Oct. 2006) (emphasis added).
317. Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services under
IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers ¶ 1.16(a)(i) (Jan. 2011
rev. July 2014).
318. Id. at ¶ 1.16 n.19 (emphasis added).
319. Id. at ¶ 1.16 n.20.
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information (e.g., technical specifications) during the tender process.320 In
other cases, a government official may have awarded a Bank-financed contract to an entity in exchange for a kickback.321
The elements of a Corrupt Practice vary somewhat depending on
which definition applies. Distilling the elements, a Corrupt Practice involves offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, directly or indirectly, anything of value to improperly influence the actions of a public official in relation to the procurement process or contract execution.322
The written elements of the Corrupt Practice definition strongly resemble those of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, which make it illegal
to corruptly offer or provide money or anything of value to officials of foreign governments, foreign political parties, or public international organizations with the intent to obtain or retain business.323 Those familiar with
the FCPA, however, should not automatically equate this standard with a
Corrupt Practice. As described below, though there are commonalities between the two, the FCPA has not always been interpreted or applied in the
same manner as a Corrupt Practice.
1. Offering or Giving a Thing of Value
Liability for a Corrupt Practice requires that the respondent gives or
offers, either directly or indirectly, anything of value.324 Bank Guidelines
and Sanctions Board decisions have not defined the term “anything of value.” Available Sanctions Board decisions regarding a Corrupt Practice
generally involve the transfer of money, but Bank Guidelines and Sanctions
Board decisions have never suggested that the term “anything of value” is
limited to money. Indeed, in Sanctions Board Decision No. 78, the Sanctions Board determined that employing a project manager’s daughter qualified as a thing of value for the project manager.325 In Sanctions Board Decision No. 66, the Sanctions Board similarly concluded that hiring a World
320. See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 84 (2013) (showing an example of a
firm that allegedly attempted to influence a Procurement Advisor).
321. See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 29 (2012) (stating that two consortium partners agreed to a bribe via a management fee in a contract).
322. Cf. Sanctions Board Decision No. 70, ¶ 20 (2014) (“In accordance with the definition of a corrupt practice under Paragraph 1.14(a)(i) of the October 2006 Procurement
Guidelines, INT bears the initial burden to show that it is more likely than not that Respondents (i) offered or gave, directly or indirectly, anything of value (ii) to influence improperly
the actions of another party.”).
323. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2016).
324. Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 65 (2013).
325. The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 78, ¶¶ 53–54
(2015).
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Bank staff member’s son satisfied this element.326
The same term in the FCPA is not defined in the statute or legislative
history, but it is commonly understood to include items such as gifts, travel,
entertainment, jobs and internships, favors, meals, educational and medical
expenses, and travel assistance.327 And there is no statutory exception for
nominal payments or gifts.328 This element of the FCPA’s anti-bribery
provisions seems consistent with the Bank’s definition of a Corrupt Practice. Consummated and attempted bribes are proscribed in each domain, as
are nontraditional bribes, such as offers of jobs and internships. Both regimes also lack any explicit exception for nominal payments.
The Sanctions Board considers the terms “give” and “offer” as alternative elements of a Corrupt Practice.329 The term “offer” refers to “both a
proactive offer of payment and a promise or commitment to pay a bribe
when solicited.”330 Thus, even if no payment occurs, the mere offer of a
bribe can qualify as a Corrupt Practice.331 In Sanctions Board Decision No.
60, for example, a consultancy agreement required the respondent to pay
five percent of the total contract value to a Bank-employed procurement
advisor.332 The consultancy agreement contemplated a five-percent fee for
other, future contracts.333 The Sanctions Board acknowledged that the record showed no evidence of an actual payment in connection with the other
contracts.334 But based on the consultancy agreement, and coupled with
other corroborating evidence,335 the Sanctions Board concluded that the respondent’s promise of future payments to the procurement advisor was an
offer for purposes of a Corrupt Practice.336
326. Sanctions Board Decision No. 66, ¶ 24 (2014).
327. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FCPA: A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 14-15 (2012).
328. F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Elizabeth Goergen Silver, The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Enforcement and Compliance, 285 SECURITIES PRACTICE
PORTFOLIO SERIES (BNA) A-16 (2014).
329. Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 70 (2013); Sanctions Board Decision No. 78, ¶
54 (2015).
330. Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 73 (2013).
331. Id. at ¶ 70; see also Sanctions Board Decision No. 63, ¶ 59 (2014) (“[T]he first element of the definition of corrupt practices requires only that the Respondents have offered
or given something of value – not that all the earmarked funds were ultimately disbursed.”).
332. Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 71 (2013).
333. Id.
334. Id. at ¶ 72.
335. In particular, the Sanctions Board noted that respondent provided a listing of all
contracts in which the Procurement Advisor was involved and the type of services provided.
Id. Further, INT interviews and email correspondence revealed communications between
the respondent and the procurement advisor regarding tenders before the public issuance of
the bidding documents and during the procurement processes. Id.
336. Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 74 (2013).
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The Sanctions Board has found that even silence, although not explicitly contemplated in the Bank Guidelines defining a Corrupt Practice, can
constitute an offer of a bribe. Acquiescence by silence occurs when “the
silent party heard and understood what was being said” and “the silence in
response to what was being said was, under the circumstances, so unnatural
as to amount to implied acquiescence.”337 In Sanctions Board Decision No.
50, the Sanctions Board concluded that “persistent silence – in the face of
repeated attempts to make unexplained reallocations that happen to correspond to the amount of the alleged improper payment at issue – is more
likely than not a sign Respondent had agreed to the payment scheme.”338
The respondent and several business partners attended a meeting at which
an agreement was reached to improperly pay an agency seventeen percent
of a contract’s value as a “management fee.”339 INT acknowledged that the
respondent’s director was silent during the meeting, but contended that his
silence signaled acquiescence to offering a bribe.340 The Sanctions Board
was not persuaded that the meeting alone constituted such an offer, but it
considered additional evidence, including a subsequent meeting at which
the respondent commented that the partners should honor their commitments or risk harm.341 Perhaps most influential to the Sanctions Board’s
decision was a series of email exchanges over the course of two months between the partners concerning a dispute over the allocation of funds.342 The
respondent was copied on the emails but remained silent throughout.343
The Sanctions Board also has recognized that although the Guidelines
do “not explicitly provide for liability on the basis of support, authorization, and oversight of corrupt acts[;] a respondent cannot avoid liability
simply by directing or empowering another party to make corrupt payments.”344 Thus, like the FCPA, liability for corrupt practices can extend to
situations involving “instructions or orders, approval or guidance, or inferred authorization in cases of close supervision,” or “a duty to supervise
combined with deliberate non-intervention.”345 In Sanctions Board Decision No. 64, the Sanctions Board squarely considered this issue. In that decision, the Sanctions Board determined that the respondent was not culpable for a bribery scheme where there was no evidence that he instructed or
337. Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 30 (2012) (citing J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ 801(d)(2)(B)[01], at 801-202 n.15 (1985)).
338. Id. at ¶ 37 (2012).
339. Id. at ¶ 29.
340. Id.
341. Id. at ¶ 41.
342. Id. at ¶¶ 36-37.
343. Id. at ¶ 37.
344. Sanctions Board Decision No. 64, ¶ 37 (2014).
345. Id.
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ordered the payment of bribes, played any role in discussions to initiate the
scheme, or approved or guided the alleged misconduct.346 The Sanctions
Board also found insufficient evidence that the respondent had a duty to
supervise the employee who allegedly paid the bribes, knew of or was willfully blind to the employee’s misconduct, and did not intervene.347
2. Solicitation
Bank Guidelines and Sanctions Board decisions do not define “soliciting.” Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, discussed above, is one of the only
publicly available decisions to consider this term. There, the question was
whether a managing director’s comment to consortium partners regarding
the necessity of honoring commitments—which INT contended was an effort to pressure the partners to participate in the bribery scheme—
constituted solicitation, albeit on behalf of someone else.348 The Sanctions
Board answered in the affirmative, noting that “[n]othing in the applicable
definition specifies that one must solicit payment for oneself, or that the soliciting party must be the party with influence.”349 The Sanctions Board
concluded that solicitation includes “both the act of soliciting something
for oneself in exchange for exerting improper influence, as well as the act
of soliciting or enticing another to give something to a third party in exchange for the third party’s improper influence.”350 Hence, the term “soliciting” encompasses asking for and accepting a bribe, as well as asking or
enticing another to commit bribery. In Sanctions Board Decision No. 78,
sufficient evidence of solicitation was present where a project manager
emailed companies requesting that they consider hiring her daughter.351
3. Public Official / Another Party
As discussed above, for contracts governed by earlier definitions of a
Corrupt Practice, the respondent must act with a purpose to “influence the
action of a public official in the [procurement] process or in contract execution.”352 Later versions of the Guidelines require a motivation to influence
“another party.”353 As noted above, however, a footnote in the Guidelines
346. Id. at ¶ 38.
347. Id. at ¶ 39.
348. Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 42 (2012).
349. Id. at ¶ 44.
350. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)).
351. Sanctions Board Decision No. 78, ¶ 63 (2015).
352. Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty, 2011
WORLD BANK GROUP SANCTIONS BD. LAW DIGEST, ch. D, §2(a), at 52.
353. Id. at 53.
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defines “another party” as “a public official acting in relation to the [procurement or selection] process or contract execution.”354 The Guidelines
also state that “[i]n this context, ‘public official’ includes World Bank staff
and employees of other organizations taking or reviewing procurement decisions.”355 The Sanctions Board likewise has held that the terms “public
official” and “another party” refer to “public officials acting in relation to
the procurement process or contract execution, including ‘World Bank staff
and employees of other organizations taking or reviewing procurement decisions.’”356 It is not synonymous with the term “government official.” 357
The only publicly available Sanctions Board decision analyzing this
element concluded that a short-term consultant for the Bank qualified as a
“public official,” even though the consultant never held a World Bank staff
position or formal appointment related to the contracts at issue.358 The
Sanctions Board noted that “[e]ven without being officially assigned responsibility in a procurement process, a public official may have an actual
or perceived role in taking or reviewing procurement decisions, and thus be
the target of sanctionable influence.”359 Although formal designations are
unnecessary, qualifying as a “public official” does require some position of
influence over the contract at issue.360 The Sanctions Board found that the
short-term consultant’s involvement in the procurement process for the
contracts at issue, coupled with his employment as a consultant for the
World Bank during the years in which the alleged misconduct occurred,
qualified him to meet the definition of a “public official.”361
The “foreign official” element of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions—as interpreted—is clearly broader than its World Bank analogue.
U.S. courts have addressed the scope of the FCPA’s definition when issuing jury instructions in FCPA trials. The FCPA defines a “foreign official”
354. Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services under
IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants ¶ 1.16 n.20 (Jan. 2011 rev. July 2014); see also
Sanctions Board Decision No. 70, ¶ 22 (2014) (discussing this explanatory note).
355. See Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services under
IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants, supra note 34 (emphasis omitted); see also Sanctions Board Decision No. 66, ¶ 25 (2014) (stating that a World Bank staff member qualifies
as a public official).
356. Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 75 (2013) (citing the May 2004 Procurement
Guidelines, § 1.14(a)(i) n.17, and October 2006 Procurement Guidelines, § 1.14(a)(i) n.19).
357. Sanctions Board Decision No. 78, ¶ 45 (2015).
358. Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 77 (2013).
359. Id. at ¶ 78.
360. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 77-78 (stating that without official responsibility for procurement,
a public official may still have a real or perceived role in the procurement decision-making
process, which can open the official to outside influence); Sanctions Board Decision No. 50,
¶ 45 (2012).
361. Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 78 (2013).
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as “any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization,
or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such
government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or . . . public international organization.”362 Employees of all ranks fall within the scope of
this provision.363 Precisely what constitutes a foreign government “agency”
or “instrumentality,” however, has been the subject of litigation, owing to
the government’s broad interpretation of those terms.364 A “public international organization” is any organization designated as such by executive
order and includes organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the Red Cross.365 Employees
of such organizations qualify as foreign officials under the FCPA.366
Finally, it bears mentioning that the mental state necessary to satisfy
the “public official” element of a Corrupt Practice is unclear. The few relevant Sanctions Board publicly available decisions generally focus on
whether the recipient was, in fact, a public official. But the Sanctions
Board has never specifically considered—and World Bank Guidelines do
not provide—whether the respondent must know it was bribing a public official. In one FCPA enforcement case, in contrast, Judge James V. Selna of
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California issued instructions that specifically required the jury to determine whether the bribe was
to “a person the defendant knew or believed to be a foreign official.”367 But
some mental culpability clearly is required to commit a Corrupt Practice
because the Sanctions Board has stated that the respondent must have “acted with a purpose to (i) ‘influence the action of a public official[‘] . . . or
(ii) ‘influence improperly the actions of another party.’”368 Although purposeful influence is required, it is less clear if this means a respondent must
have known or believed that the recipient was a public official. From the
limited precedent available, the answer appears to be that a respondent
must understand, at some level, it is attempting to bribe a public official. In
Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, the Sanctions Board concluded that the
respondent committed a Corrupt Practice because he “approved a payment
362. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (2016).
363. See F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Elizabeth Goergen Silver, The U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Enforcement and Compliance 285 SECURITIES PRACTICE
PORTFOLIO SERIES (BNA) at A-13 (2014) (broadly subjecting all ranks of employees to this
“foreign official” element of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provision).
364. Id.
365. Id. at A-14.
366. Id.
367. Order Regarding Select Jury Instructions at 11, United States v. Carson, SACR 0900077 JVS (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2012).
368. Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 75 (2013) (emphasis added).
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that he knew was intended to influence a public official.”369 Moreover, the
Sanctions Board indirectly suggested that unawareness of the recipient’s
status as a public official would have constituted a valid defense to a Corrupt Practice when it rejected the respondent’s contention that they “were
not aware of the Procurement Advisor’s official status, since he had introduced himself as an independent expert in his communications with
them.”370 Nevertheless, in the same decision, the Sanctions Board noted
that INT need not prove that the respondent “knew the identity of the specific beneficiary of [the] payment.”371
4. To Influence (Improperly) the Action of a Public Official
This element varies to some degree depending on which definition of
a Corrupt Practice applies. Earlier Bank Guidelines require a motive “to
influence the action of a public official in the [procurement or selection]
process or in contract execution.”372 The current definition requires a motivation to “influence improperly the actions of another party,”373 presumably obviating arguments that a certain bribe somehow skirted both the procurement process and the contract’s execution. Although Bank Guidelines
do not define improper influence, the Sanctions Board has taken an expansive approach. In Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, the Sanctions Board
found that payments to a procurement advisor “to do his job properly” and
to avoid unfair treatment constituted improper influence.374 The Sanctions
Board held that the term “improper influence is not limited to circumstances in which a public official is induced to act in breach of his or her duties
(e.g., by promoting an unqualified bidder for contract award).”375 Rather,
the Sanctions Board concluded that it also encompasses payments made in
order to cause “a public official to act or refrain from acting in connection
with his or her official duties . . . regardless of whether the official’s act

369.
370.
371.
372.

Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
Id. at 83.
Id. at ¶ 81.
Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 52. This definition
applied to any cases brought under either the January 1995 version of the Procurement
Guidelines, which was revised in January and August 1996, September 1997, and January
1999, or the January 1997 version of the Consultant Guidelines, which was revised in September 1997, January 1999, and May 2002. Id.
373. Id. at 53 (emphasis added). This definition applies to cases brought under the October 2006, May 2010, or January 2011 versions of the Procurement or Consultant Guidelines,
or under the October 2006 or January 2011 version of the Anticorruption Guidelines. Id.
374. Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 80 (2013).
375. Id. at ¶ 82 (internal quotations omitted).
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would have been lawful had the payment or offer not been made.”376 This
view accords with the Legal Vice Presidency’s 2010 advisory opinion,
which opined that the giving of a bribe is inherently improper, “whether or
not the person accepting the bribe takes any improper action, or even
whether or not the bribe is intended to induce an improper action . . . .”377
In light of the Sanctions Board’s expansive interpretation of the term
“improper,” it seems there is no carve-out for the kind of “facilitating payments” contemplated by the FCPA. Under the FCPA’s facilitating payments exception, payments may be made to secure the performance of nondiscretionary, “routine government action,” such as processing visas, obtaining work permits, or similar clerical acts.378 Though Sanctions Board
decisions have not explicitly ruled out facilitating payments, its imposition
of liability in Sanctions Board Decision No. 70—in which the respondent
acknowledged making a payment of $4,000 to facilitate the processing of
items through customs—seems at odds with the FCPA’s statutory exception for facilitating payments379 That payment arguably was intended to
“move a particular matter toward an eventual act or decision” and did not
involve “any discretionary action.”380 Indeed, the Legal Vice Presidency’s
advisory opinion takes the position that, because bribes intended to induce
even proper action are improper, “facilitation payments are not exempted”
from the ambit of a Corrupt Practice.381
Also unclear is whether, or to what extent, the respondent’s mental
state bears on the definition of “influence improperly.” The Sanctions
Board has made clear that the respondent must have “acted with a purpose
to . . . influence improperly the actions of another party . . . .” 382 This
phrasing suggests that, at minimum, a respondent must act intentionally to
influence another, and the means of influence must be improper. Less
clear, however, is whether the term “with a purpose” means the respondent
must know or believe its influence is improper. If so, does the respondent’s
376. Id.
377. Anne-Marie Leroy, Advisory Opinion on Certain Issues Arising in Connection with
Recent Sanctions Cases, Opinion No. 2010/1, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY UNIT OF THE WORLD
BANK, ¶ 55 (Nov. 15, 2010).
378. Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Enforcement Div. of the U.S. Sec. and
Exch. Comm’n, FCPA: A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 25
(2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.
pdf [https://perma.cc/V2RF-X4MU].
379. Sanctions Board Decision No. 70, ¶ 20 (2014).
380. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977). See also Michael S. Diamant & Jesenka
Mrdjenovic, Don’t You Forget About Me: The Continuing Viability of the FCPA’s Facilitating Payments Exception, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 19 (2012) (discussing H.R. Rep. No. 95-640 and
the facilitating payments exception).
381. Anne-Marie Leroy, supra note 377, at ¶ 55.
382. Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, supra note 374, at ¶ 75 (emphasis added).
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subjective belief of improper conduct suffice or must the respondent believe his or her conduct is improper as defined by the World Bank? The
Sanctions Board has thus far not addressed this issue in any publicly available decision.
Comparing this standard with the FCPA’s mens rea requirement
shows a key similarity and a key difference. The FCPA requires corrupt
intent. It does not define the term, but legislative history states that “[t]he
word ‘corruptly’ connotes an evil motive or purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the recipient.”383 Legislative history also clarifies that the
FCPA was intended to distinguish payments “to induce the recipient to
misuse his official position”384 and payments “which merely move a particular matter toward an eventual act or decision or which do not involve any
discretionary action.”385 Again, the latter are facilitation payments and do
not give rise to liability under the FCPA.386
Further, the FCPA prohibits offers or payments to a foreign official
for the purpose of “obtaining or retaining business.”387 But the sought-after
business need not be with the foreign government or foreign government
instrumentality that receives the offer or payment.388 This element of the
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions is slightly more specific than the Bank’s
definition of a Corrupt Practice. The Bank’s definition encompasses payments to “improperly influence the actions of another party,” and the
Guidelines explain that an influence is “improper” if it is intended to yield
an “undue advantage.”389 In the context of Bank enforcement actions discussed above, however, “undue advantage” would almost always result in
commercial and economic benefits not otherwise available, bringing the
practical implications of this definition very much in line with the FCPA’s
“obtaining or retaining business” requirement.
Duress likely is an available defense to a Corrupt Practice.390 The
World Bank Guidelines and Sanction Board decisions have not defined duress, and the only relevant publicly available decision on this topic found
that the record failed to support a finding of duress. In Sanctions Board
Decision No. 60, the respondents alleged “that they were subject to an extortion scheme and acted under duress, with the Consultancy Agreement
383. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977).
384. Id.
385. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, supra note 380, at 8.
386. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b). For a more detailed discussion of facilitation payments, see
Warin et. al., supra note 22, at A-17.
387. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a).
388. See Warin et. al., supra note 22, at A-16 (interpreting the meaning of the FCPA
prohibitions on payments to foreign officials).
389. World Bank Procurement Guidelines, supra note 39, at ¶ 1.16 n.19.
390. Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, supra note 368, at ¶ 88.
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imposed on them by the Procurement Advisor.”391 In rejecting this argument, the Sanctions Board noted that the respondents invited the Procurement Advisor to travel abroad with them and actively sought his advice.392
Although the respondents claimed they felt obligated to pay the procurement advisor, the Sanctions Board found “no evidence that such payments
were due to threats, implicit or express, or that they made any attempt to
terminate their arrangement with the Procurement Advisor.”393
In rejecting the argument from the respondents, the Sanctions Board
implicitly acknowledged that duress could be a valid defense to a Corrupt
Practice charge. This is intuitive. The intent level required for any infraction can be obviated if the actor was compelled to the action by an external
force against his or her will. The U.S. enforcers of the FCPA have explicitly acknowledged as much in the context of that law’s enforcement.394 Here
too, despite the differing texts, there appears to be some convergence in the
practical operation of these two anti-bribery regimes. This concurrence
could allow the FCPA’s more-developed jurisprudence, forged through
nearly 40 years of enforcement, to inform aspects of Sanctions Board’s understanding of a Corrupt Practice.
D. Collusive Practice
Collusive conduct is a common form of wrongdoing leading to sanctions.395 The definition of a Collusive Practice has gradually shifted from
narrow, specifically-defined conduct involving artificial price fixing between bidders or consultants to any form of simulated competition including any participants in the procurement process. In its earliest form, collusion was subsumed by the definition of a Fraudulent Practice, with the
latter defined to “include[] collusive practices among [bidders/consultants]
(prior to or after [bid submission/submission of proposals]) designed to establish [bid] prices at artificial, non-competitive levels and to deprive the
Borrower of the benefits of free and open competition.”396 Starting in
2004, collusion became a standalone Sanctionable Practice defined as “a
scheme or arrangement between two or more [bidders/consultants], with or
without the knowledge of the Borrower, designed to establish [bid] prices
391. Id. at ¶ 86.
392. Id. at ¶ 87.
393. Id. at ¶ 87.
394. Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 372, at 27.
395. World Bank Group, supra note 367, at 22.
396. Id. at 48 (Dec. 2011). This definition applies to cases brought under the January
1995 version of the Procurement Guidelines, which were revised in January and August
1996, September 1997, and January 1999, or the January 1997 version of the Consultant
Guidelines, which were revised in September 1997, January 1999, and May 2002. Id. at 47.
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at artificial, non-competitive levels.”397
The Guidelines currently define a Collusive Practice expansively as
(1) “an arrangement between two or more parties” (2) “designed to achieve
an improper purpose, including to influence improperly the actions of another party . . . .”398 Although the terms “influence improperly” and “improper purpose” appear to contemplate a wide array of misconduct, an explanatory footnote narrows their application by defining the term “parties”
as “participants in the procurement process (including public officials) attempting either themselves, or through another person or entity not participating in the procurement or selection process, to simulate competition or
to establish bid prices at artificial, non-competitive levels, or are privy to
each other’s bid prices or other conditions.”399 This footnote alters the
standard of finding a Collusive Practice from prior definitions in two significant ways: first, collusion can involve both participants and nonparticipants in the procurement process. Second, a Collusive Practice now
includes conduct attempting to “simulate competition” in addition to, as
provided in prior versions, conduct intended to create artificial, noncompetitive bid prices. World Bank Guidelines and Sanctions Board decisions do not differentiate “simulate[d] competition” from other forms of
collusion.
Typical collusion cases involve allegations of coordinated bid pricing
to ensure that one individual or entity wins the contract.400 Although many
Sanctions Board decisions involve collusion, the available case law is
sparse: no publicly available full-text decision and only five summarized
decisions in the Law Digest discuss collusion.401 Two of the five cases discussed in the Law Digest found insufficient evidence of a Collusive Practice.402 In the Law Digest cases, INT alleged that respondents engaged in
collusive behavior to obtain a disproportionately large number of contracts,403 participated in a collusive scheme involving government officials
to direct awards to certain contractors in exchange for bribes,404 and coor397. Id. at 48 (Dec. 2011). This definition applies to cases brought under the May 2004
versions of the Procurement or Consultant Guidelines. Id.
398. World Bank Procurement Guidelines, supra note 39, at ¶ 1.16(a)(iii).
399. Id. at ¶ 1.16(a)(iii) n.22.
400. Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011, at 30 (Dec. 2011) (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40 (2010)); id. at 32 (citing Sanctions Board Decision
No. 45 (2011)).
401. Id. at 25-32.
402. Id. at 26 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 4 (2009) and Sanctions Board Decision No. 5 (2009)).
403. Id. (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 4 (2009)).
404. Id. at 30 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40 (2010)).
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dinated bid prices with other firms to ensure that the respondent would win
the contract.405
1. Elements of a Collusive Practice
The available guidance from the Sanctions Board concerns only the
elements of a Collusive Practice as defined in the May 2004 Procurement
Guidelines.406 The Sanctions Board has held that proving the first element
of a Collusive Practice—i.e., whether a scheme or arrangement between
bidders exists—does not automatically satisfy the second element of a Collusive Practice—i.e., that the scheme or arrangement was designed to set
prices at artificial, non-competitive levels.407 The Law Digest further explains that the term “artificial, non-competitive levels” involves “the nature
of the pricing, not the simple quantitative level of the prices.”408 Because
“[c]olluding bidders might well agree to submit relatively low prices” or,
conversely, “submit higher prices for any number of reasons,” a showing of
specific price points “is therefore neither necessary nor sufficient to establish collusion.”409
The mens rea necessary to commit a Collusive Practice is unclear. It
appears, however, that some amount of intent is required, as the arrangement must be “designed to achieve an improper purpose” under the latest
definition,410 or “designed to establish [bid] prices at artificial, noncompetitive levels” under prior definitions.411
2. Evidence of Collusion
It is difficult to completely understand the Sanctions Board’s assessment of collusive evidence without the benefit of fully published decisions.
The available summaries in the Law Digest, however, suggest that the
Sanctions Board relies heavily on circumstantial indicia of collusion.412 In
Sanctions Board Decision No. 1, the Sanctions Board gave “primary
weight” to and found “particularly compelling” evidence that two of the respondents had identical pricing in the same bid tender and concluded that it
405. Id. (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40 (2010)); id. at 32 (citing Sanctions
Board Decision No. 45 (2011)).
406. Id. at 48-49.
407. Id. at 48 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 45, ¶ 51 (2011)).
408. Id. at 49 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 45, ¶ 51 (2011)).
409. Id. (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 45, ¶ 51 (2011)).
410. Id. at 48.
411. Id.
412. See id. at 49 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 4, ¶¶ 3, 6 (2009), which states
that the Sanctions Board used different factors as evidence of indicia of collusion).
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was more likely than not that the parties had engaged in Collusive Practices, especially in light of their failure to adequately explain the similarities.413 But, as discussed above, INT need not show specific pricing across
bids to prove collusion. Likewise, in Sanctions Board Decision No. 4, the
Sanctions Board found collusion by relying on high bid prices, bids containing “significant errors,” “strange and unnatural” bid prices, symmetrical
relationships among bids, the submission of fraudulent bid securities, and
“clusters” of bids.414
In Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, the Sanctions Board similarly
found the respondents liable in light of an “inexplicable degree of congruity” across bid prices, identical total bid prices in certain sections of two of
the bids at issue, and “insignificant variance” between the total prices of all
bids. The Sanctions Board also rejected the respondent’s contention that
the similar bid prices were caused by shared suppliers in a small market,
finding that a “simple commonality of suppliers . . . would not explain the
high degree of congruity . . . nor the systematic small variations between
prices.”415 Moreover, it pointed to physical similarities across bids that indicated their shared preparation, including similar handwriting, identical
substantive and spelling errors, common contact information, identical envelopes, cover sheets with the same font, the same computer file path number at the bottom of the bid documents, and “the apparent re-use of bidding
documents from one firm, whose name had been partially concealed with
correction fluid, by another firm.”416
The Sanctions Board has taken this approach on other occasions. In
Sanctions Board No. 45, the Sanctions Board relied on documentary evidence showing several identical errors and other physical similarities across
bids in concluding that there was “ample support for [INT’s] allegation that
the bids submitted by the respondent and another firm had been jointly prepared with coordinated bid prices.”417 In addition, while the “use of shared
administrative support by different bidders” is not necessarily proof of collusion, it suggests the existence of collusion “when viewed in conjunction
with other evidence of extensive and substantive similarities across the bids
in question.”418 Circumstantial evidence of collusion is not boundless. The
Sanctions Board has found that general business cooperation among bidders—i.e., referring to other bidders as “business colleagues,” “common
business interests,” or prior work on the same project—is “neither a viable
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

Id. (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 1, ¶ 6 (2007)).
Id. (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 4, ¶¶ 3, 6 (2009)).
Id. at 50 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶ 21 (2010)).
Id. (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶ 22 (2010)).
Id. at 52 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 45, ¶¶ 30-33 (2011)).
Id. at 51 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶ 23 (2010)).
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explanation for the proximity of bids in an allegedly collusive scheme, nor
presumptive proof of collusion between the bidders.”419
Of course, in addition to circumstantial evidence in the bids themselves, the Sanctions Board reviews the “totality of the evidence [available
to it], including all statements made in the interviews, read in context and
weighted for relative credibility.”420 In Sanctions Board Decision No. 4,
the Sanctions Board found compelling testimonial evidence of “confidential and non-confidential witnesses” coupled with other “indicia of collusion, including high bid prices, symmetrical relationships among bids, bids
containing significant errors, ‘clusters’ of bids, ‘strange and unnatural’ bid
prices, submission of fraudulent bid securities, and the inconsistent application of criteria within the prequalification process.”421
In Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, the Sanctions Board found that
one respondent’s statement regarding a “verbal or gentleman’s agreement”
coupled with another bidder’s admission “to having known about the proximity in bid prices” and making a mistake by not carefully reviewing the
bids “could be construed to some degree as admissions of collusive arrangements.”422 In Sanctions Board Decision No. 45, collusion was substantiated through corroborating statements from key witnesses indicating
that the bids submitted by the respondent and another firm had been jointly
prepared with coordinated bid prices.423 Moreover, the Sanctions Board
has considered testimonial evidence of witnesses who initially denied but
later admitted to collusive conduct because not “all participants in an alleged collusive arrangement will spontaneously and consistently admit the
charges.”424
3. U.S. Antitrust Law
Clear parallels between the Bank’s anti-collusion regime and U.S. antitrust law exist. Just as the Bank’s Guidelines prohibit arrangements designed to set bid prices at artificial levels, U.S. antitrust laws proscribe a
wide variety of anti-competitive behavior. In the United States, antitrust
violations are subject to criminal and civil enforcement under the Sherman
Antitrust Act, among other statutes. Antitrust liability under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act arises where (1) the defendant was “a party to a contract,
419. Id. at 47 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶ 27 (2010)).
420. Id. at 51 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶ 25 (2010)).
421. Id. at 49 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 4, ¶¶ 3, 6 (2009)).
422. Id. at 51 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶ 24 (2010)).
423. Id. at 52 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 45, ¶¶ 30-33 (2011), which notes
key witnesses’ corroborating statements in finding collusion).
424. Id. at 51 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶ 25 (2010)).
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combination . . . or conspiracy” and (2) “the conspiracy to which the defendant was a party imposed an unreasonable restraint on trade.”425 U.S.
courts analyze the latter element according to the “rule of reason,” which,
under a “totality of the circumstances” test, considers whether the conduct
in question promotes or suppresses market competition.426 Certain practices, such as bid rigging and price fixing, are presumptively an unreasonable
restraint on competition and are thus considered a per se violation of the
Sherman Act.427 As such, per se violations require no further inquiry into
the unlawful practice’s actual effect on the market or the intentions of those
who engaged in the practice.428
Though never addressed explicitly by the Sanctions Board or the
Guidelines, there appears to be little room in Bank jurisprudence for the
kind of “rule of reason” approach contemplated by U.S. courts. Unlike the
Sherman Act, the definition of a Collusive Practice does not consider
whether the conduct at issue impacted the market. But all relevant publicly
available Sanctions Board decisions involve some variation of price fixing
and bid rigging, both of which are presumed under U.S. law to negatively
impact competition. In theory, however, a defense should be available for
respondents who enter into arrangements for a purpose that is not “improper.”
Both the Sherman Act and World Bank require evidence of conspiracy
between parties; however, the standard of proof under each regime diverges
significantly. As discussed above, the Sanctions Board has found sufficient
evidence of an agreement through, for example, high prices across bids,
significant errors across bids, “strange and unnatural” prices across bids,
symmetrical relationships among bids, identical pricing between respondents in the same bid tender, and an “otherwise inexplicable degree of congruity” across bid prices.429 Such evidence, labeled “conscious parallelism”
425. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 315 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
426. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 n.15 (1977) (requiring that
the fact finder weigh “all of the circumstances” to determine whether a restrictive practice
imposes “an unreasonable restraint on competition”).
427. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 315 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
428. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Antitrust Laws, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/WH8MDY6S] (last visited Apr. 3 2016) (explaining that the Sherman Act provides no defense or
justification to per se violators whose acts so harmful to competition that they are almost
always illegal.)
429. See Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 49-50 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 4, ¶¶ 3, 6 (2009); Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶¶ 20-24
(2010)) (listing numerous circumstances under which the Sanction Board has found suffi-
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by U.S. courts, is insufficient under the Sherman Act because it “does not
establish . . . contract, combination, or conspiracy.”430 Where the claim relies on parallel conduct, U.S. courts have commonly required plaintiffs to
proffer evidence of “plus factors” to meet the conspiracy element, such as
“motive to conspire,” “parallel acts [that] were against the apparent economic self-interest” of those involved, and “a high level of interfirm communications.”431 These factors, according to U.S. courts, “tend to ensure
that courts punish concerted action—an actual agreement—instead of the
unilateral, independent conduct of competitors.”432
The Sanctions Board, by contrast, has found collusion solely through
parallel behavior, without the “plus factors” U.S. courts typically require.
In Sanctions Board Decision No. 1, for example, the Sanctions Board
found “particularly compelling the circumstantial evidence of identical
pricing between the respondents in the same bid tender” to the point of
shifting the burden of proof on the respondents to explain how their conduct was not collusive.433 In Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, the Sanctions Board found collusion where there was an
inexplicable degree of congruity across the bid prices contained
in the three bids at issue, including a significant number of unit
prices that were either identical or differed consistently by small,
standardized amounts across the three bids; identical total bid
prices in several sections of two bids . . . and insignificant variance between the total prices of all bids.434

This lower evidentiary standard likely stems from the administrative
nature of Sanctions Board proceedings, but it also risks conflating independent actions between competitors with truly collusive conduct.435

cient evidence of collusion).
430. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-54 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (establishing a “plausibility” standard for pleading).
431. In re Publ’n Paper Antitrust Litig., 690 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383,
398 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[E]vidence of conscious parallelism cannot alone create a reasonable
inference of a conspiracy. To move the ball across the goal line, a plaintiff must also show
that certain plus factors are present . . . [which] may include (1) evidence that the defendant
had a motive to enter into a price fixing conspiracy; (2) evidence that the defendant acted
contrary to its interests; and (3) evidence implying a traditional conspiracy.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
432. Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
433. Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 supra 225 note, at 49
(citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 1, ¶ 6 (2007)).
434. Id. at 50 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶ 21 (2010)).
435. To be fair, the burden of proof for civil antitrust enforcement actions also is a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Abbott Labs., 853 F. Supp.
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E. Coercive Practice
The January 2011 Procurement Guidelines define a “Coercive Practice” as “impairing or harming, or threatening to impair or harm, directly or
indirectly, any party or the property of the party to influence improperly the
actions of a party.”436 The term “party” is defined as “a participant in the
procurement process or contract execution.”437
The Sanctions Board had not reviewed an appeal involving allegations
of a Coercive Practice as of publication of the Law Digest.438 Moreover,
none of the published decisions available as of December 2015 on the
Bank’s website involves allegations of a Coercive Practice. One World
Bank publication, however, has provided that coercion includes threats to
harm the future business interests of a competitor or the physical wellbeing of competitors’ staff to ensure that they submit inflated bids.439 Coercion could also involve the payment of money to “losing” bidders to obtain the winning bid.440
There is at least one instance in which the SDO sanctioned a person
for engaging in a Coercive Practice. In 2014, the Bank debarred an individual for a minimum period of five years for engaging in Fraudulent and
Coercive Practices.441 INT alleged that the respondent “engaged in a coercive practice by threatening an individual.”442 Because he failed to submit
a response, the accusations and recommended sanction were uncontested.443
526, 535 (D.D.C. 1994) (refusing to find collusion because a preponderance of the evidence
did not establish that the defendant’s bids in question had resulted from collusion with its
competitors).
436. World Bank Procurement Guidelines, supra note 142, at ¶ 1.16(a)(iv). Before the
World Bank’s 2006 reforms, Coercive Practice was defined as “harming or threatening to
harm, directly or indirectly, persons, or their property to influence their participation in a
procurement process, or affect the execution of a contract.” Guidelines: Procurement Under
IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, supra note 218, at ¶ 1.14(a)(iv).
437. World Bank Procurement Guidelines, supra note 142, at ¶ 1.16(a)(iv) n.23.
438. Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011, supra note 225, at 22
(reporting that the Sanctions Board had not received any appeals involving allegations of
coercion as of October 31, 2011).
439. The World Bank’s Anti-Corruption Guidelines and Sanctions Reform: A User’s
Guide, supra note 11, at 7 (defining and providing examples of coercive practice).
440. Id. (describing an instance of coercion).
441. Board Sanctions Case No. 264 (Yusri Yusuf), Notice of Uncontested Sanctions
Proceedings (2014) (notifying of the sanctions proceedings against Yusri Yusuf based on his
fraudulent practice of submitting misleading vehicle registration documents and related materials).
442. Id. at ¶ 3.
443. Id. at ¶ 7 (deeming the sanction against Yusuf uncontested because no response had
been submitted within the specific period).
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The Sanctions Board therefore did not review the case and did not issue an
opinion delineating the factual background, evidence, or analysis.
Beyond these brief examples, little else is known concerning the legal
elements and evidentiary requirements for finding a Coercive Practice.
The concept of coercion is found throughout U.S. law, including as a
prohibited criminal offense and an affirmative defense to criminal charges.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines coercion as “[c]ompulsion of a free agent
by physical, moral, or economic force or threat of physical force.”444 In the
criminal context, coercion is defined as follows:
Coercion intended to restrict another’s freedom of action by
(1) threatening to commit a criminal act against that person;
(2) threatening to accuse that person of having committed a criminal act; (3) threatening to expose a secret that either would subject the victim to hatred, contempt, or ridicule or would impair
the victim’s credit or goodwill, or (4) taking or withholding official action or causing an official to take or withhold action.445

In addition to its criminal application, coercion can include “[c]onduct
that constitutes the improper use of economic power to compel another to
submit to the wishes of one who wields it.”446
Due to the broad language used by the Bank to define Coercive Practices and the lack of precedent, it is difficult to pinpoint which U.S. laws
are most comparable and could serve as a vehicle to analyze the possible
contours of this Sanctionable Practice as it develops in Sanctions Board;
however, a few states have adopted criminal coercion statutes based on
Model Penal Code § 212.5 that appear to be analogous.447 For example,
New York criminalizes coercion under its penal law.448 The statute provides, in part, as follows:
A person is guilty of coercion in the second degree when he or
she compels or induces a person to engage in conduct which the
latter has a legal right to abstain from engaging in, or to abstain
from engaging in conduct in which he or she has a legal right to
engage . . . by means of instilling in him or her a fear that, if the
demand is not complied with, the actor or another will [engage in
nine threatened consequences].449
The nine listed consequences include causing “physical injury to a

444. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 315 (10th ed. 2014).
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2906 (West 2016) (defining criminal coercion
and noting that the section was derived from Model Penal Code § 212.5).
448. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.60 (McKinney 2008).
449. Id.
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person; or . . . damage to property,” both of which are explicitly included
within the Bank’s Coercive Practice definition.450 The New York statute
also outlines six other specific events that may form the basis of coercion,451 and it concludes with a catch-all provision that encompasses “any
other act which would not in itself materially benefit the actor but which is
calculated to harm another person materially with respect to his or her
health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or
personal relationships.”452 The New York statute is clearly more specific
than the Bank’s provision defining Coercive Practice. Due to the Sanctions
Board’s lack of guidance, however, it is unclear whether statutory coercion
is more or less narrowly tailored than Coercive Practice regarding the requisite underlying conduct, and if the evidence weighed by U.S. courts to
assess such conduct would be comparable to that considered by the World
Bank.
CONCLUSION
As the reach of the World Bank’s lending system continues to expand,
so too will its enforcement net. Therefore, the development of the five
Sanctionable Practices merits significant attention and care. The foregoing
is presented in the hope that it contributes to such a process, as well as
serving as a helpful primer for corporations and practitioners alike in navigating the Bank enforcement process. The robust analogues under U.S.
law are merely one place where the Sanctions Board could (and should)
look as it develops the jurisprudence of the Bank’s Sanctionable Practices.
But given the convergence of many of these legal concepts, the roots of
some of the Sanctionable Practices from U.S. law, and the long history of
these enforcement regimes in the United States, U.S. law can offer a rich
and textured reference point for the Sanctions Board. In particular, the experience of white collar enforcement and its evolution in the United States
can help to identify pitfalls and clarify thorny legal issues of, for example,
mens rea. Thorough consideration of the practical implications and study
of analogous legal concepts will lend further credibility to the Bank’s integ450. Id.
451. These events include engaging “in other conduct constituting a crime”; accusing a
person “of a crime or caus[ing] criminal charges to be instituted against him”; exposing “a
secret . . . tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule”; causing a “boycott or other collective labor group action injurious to some person’s business [except] when
the act or omission compelled is for the benefit of the group”; testifying or providing information, or refusing to do so, “with respect to another’s legal claim or defense”; and using a
“position as a public servant” to perform an act related to official duties, or refusing to do
so, “in such manner as to affect some person adversely.” Id.
452. Id.
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